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IN PACIFICATION

SEPTEMBER, 1900, TO JULY, 1901

FACTS
ABOUT THE
FILIPINOS


According to Original Outline.
First Series, XII.

ISSUED EVERY OTHER WEEK
BY THE
PHILIPPINE INFORMATION SOCIETY,
12 OTIS PLACE, BOSTON

Vol. 1, No. 10.

SEPTEMBER 15, 1901

Entered at the Post-office, Boston, Mass., as second-class mail matter, April 29, 1901.



FACTS ABOUT THE FILIPINOS

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
AS FOUND IN UNITED STATES DOCUMENTS AND OTHER AUTHENTIC
PUBLICATIONS.

The Philippine Information Society aims to place within reach of the American people the most reliable and authoritative evidence attainable in regard to the people of the Philippine Islands and our relations to them. The publications issued will be in no sense expressions of opinion, and will be compiled chiefly from government documents and furnished with full references.

If those of whatever shade of opinion who find our mediation unsatisfactory or who are not convinced of our success in getting the whole story will appeal from us to the original sources of information, our object of promoting a knowledge of the facts will be only the more effectively secured. We shall be grateful for any criticism or information convicting us of the omission of any important evidence, and will endeavor to profit thereby in future editions.

The topics to be dealt with in the first series are as follows:—

1. The Islands and the People.
2. Our Relations with the Insurgents prior to the Fall of Manila, August, 1898: Were Promises made to Aguinaldo?
3. The Insurgent Government of 1898: The Crucial Test.
4. Aguinaldo and the American Generals, August, 1898, to January, 1899: The Parting of the Ways.
5. Iloilo, An Episode of January, 1899, and Incidents leading up to the Outbreak of Hostilities: Crossing the Rubicon.
6. Outbreak of Hostilities, February 4, 1899, and Seeking an Armistice, April and May, 1899.
7. Luzon Campaign of 1899.
8. Taking the Southern Islands, January, 1898, to July, 1900.
9. A Period of Guerrilla Warfare, November, 1899, to September, 1900.
10. Progress in Pacification, September, 1900, to July, 1901.



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PROGRESS IN PACIFICATION.

September, 1900, to July, 1901.

INTRODUCTION.

In regard to the situation at the beginning of the period covered by this pamphlet, the Taft Commission believed that "a great majority of the people long for peace, and are entirely willing to accept the establishment of a government under the supremacy of the United States,"* and that, "if election confirms present policy, remnant of insurrection will disappear within sixty days by surrender of leaders and fading out of rank and file."†

General MacArthur, on the contrary, believed that the insurrection was supported by an "almost complete unity of action of the entire native population," and that "for many years to come the necessity of a large American military and naval force is too apparent to admit of discussion."

The present pamphlet, which continues the history of Philippine affairs up to July 1, 1901, is almost entirely compiled from recent official reports, telegrams, and captured documents, not yet made public, to which the editors have been allowed access through the courtesy of the War Department.

* Report of Taft Philippine Commission, page 17.

† Report of the Secretary of War for 1900, page 81. In their report of November 30 page 17, the commission qualify their earlier statement by saying that owing to Tagalog terrorizing, and the "impetus furnished by the report of the American electoral campaign," there was an "impression of great disturbance in the country in September and October." "The two unfortunate reverses of the United States troops," the report continues, "one near Siniloan and the other in Marianduque, served to render the insurgent leaders more defiant and boastful, and possibly to postpone the collapse of the insurrection, predicted in our despatch as likely to occur within sixty days after the election, for a somewhat longer period."

I. PRE-ELECTION PERIOD.

A Time of Hope for the Insurgents.

The Taft Commission says in its report of November 30, 1900, "Any statement of the conditions prevailing in these islands during the last six months, which ignores the effect of the American election as a controlling element in the situation, is necessarily inadequate." This statement is abundantly borne out by the military reports of the period, and also by the captured insurgent papers written prior to the election.

All the evidence goes to show that the Filipinos were encouraged to greater activity by hopes based upon the pending election; that they believed, as they frequently said, that the "triumph of Bryan for the Presidency is the triumph of our cause." As far back as October, 1899, a large ball was given in the Filipino capital in honor of Mr. Bryan, speeches were made, and toasts were drunk to the "friend of the Filipinos."

One of the chief duties of the Filipino representatives in foreign cities seems to have been to report on the political speeches made for or against the retention of the Philippines, and on the probable outcome of the election. It is notable that, of all the many letters of this sort seen by the editors, only one expresses any doubt of the success of the Democratic party. One letter, dated May 16, 1900,* asserts "that even in America itself the number of friends of our cause is growing larger," that "the victories achieved by our veterans in this unequal struggle appeal to the minds of these very impressionable Americans," and

* Letter from E. Riego to Insurgent General Sandico, sent to General Funston by Insurgent Lieutenant Colonel Casmiro Tinio, in August, 1900.

that "the pressure which is being brought to bear is, and should be, one of the factors towards our triumph, which will come soon if we hold out a little longer, now that it is but a short time before the election will take place, when, with the fall of McKinley, the Star-spangled Banner on our soil will have to be lowered." *

Increased Insurgent Activity.

Accordingly, during the summer and early fall the Filipino generals issued many commands to strike the Americans whenever possible, as every blow would affect the election. As a result, the Filipinos mustered their feeble resources and greatly increased the number of their ambushes and attacks. Indeed, on the 1st of September, 1900, conditions seem to have been as unfavorable as at any period of the insurrection.

The military reports for this period show:—

1. That an attack was anticipated upon all the towns in the vicinity of Manila.
2. That in Northern Luzon, owing to the scarcity of

* The letter also states that "the Imperialists argue as follows: that the Philippines have become, not a part of America, but the property of the United States; that expansion is inherent to the American nature, and the islands are sure means of wealth and advantage; that in McKinley's hands all authority should be placed regarding the future of the islands until Congress determines on something; and that the archipelago must be retained for the sake of civilization, redeeming it from the barbarous Tagalos." "The Imperialists now declare," continues the letter, "that the Philippine campaign is now ended, General Wheeler, and the Methodist bishop Poerter (Potter ? T.) confirming the statement; and the War Department says in regard to it that all that is now needed in our country is a strong constabulary force, the issuance of a proclamation in amnesty, and the declaration that all revolutionists who do not come in for pardon will be considered and treated as banditti."

The Taft Commission, says the writer, will try to negotiate for an armistice, in order that it may be reported to the American people that the Filipino "has subjected himself unconditionally to the imperialistic rule, and therefore the inference is that at last he knows that McKinley is his redeemer." Upon this point the letter urges that an "armistice is inadvisable except it be on the basis of immediate independence."

troops for the past six months, the situation had become so critical that drastic measures were urged by the officers in command.

3. That in Southern Luzon the desire for independence was unabated, and that the better classes were contributing to the insurrection.

4. That in the Visayan district, while the "men of property are a unit for peace," "the people with rifles are as persistent as they were fourteen months ago."

5. That the island of Mindanao was "like a powder magazine."

The detailed reports from the various departments follow:—

1. Conditions in the Vicinity of Manila.

The following report* indicates the disturbed condition of affairs near Manila during September:—

"*September 11, Manila.*—Provost Marshal General submits memo for the information of the Commanding General.

"It is reported with such persistency, and from so many independent sources, that there seems little doubt but that the insurgent leaders outside of Manila have arranged for simultaneous demonstration, in the nature of attacks, upon all towns garrisoned by Americans in the vicinity of Manila,—at least upon as many of them as they can muster detachments to make the attack,—on the 14th or 15th of this month."

[*Summary of omitted portions:* Information as to points at which attack was planned. Trains into city crowded with women and children.]

* Contained in Diary of Events from August 23 to September 21. Received by the War Department October 25, 1900.

2. The Department of Northern Luzon.

The department of Northern Luzon (in command September 1, 1900, of Major-general Lloyd Wheaton) comprises "all that portion of the island of Luzon lying northward of the Pasig River, and the provinces of Morong and Infanta, together with all the Philippine Islands lying northward of these lines, excepting the Calaguas group." From the map (see page 2) it will be seen that this department comprises the greater part of the island of Luzon; but it is the most thinly populated portion, the whole number of inhabitants being roughly estimated at something over 1,800,000.

The department is subdivided into six districts, the most important of which (the First District) was commanded September 1, 1900, by Brigadier-General S. B. M. Young.

(a) Reports from General Young's District.

General Young's District comprises the north-western portion of the island of Luzon, covering an area of some 8,000 square miles, and having a population of about 531,208. There are eight provinces in the district, among which are the provinces inhabited by the Ilocanos, who make up more than four-fifths of the population of General Young's District. In reading the reports which follow, it is important to remember that in the early months of the insurrection these Ilocanos were believed to be well disposed toward America, the insurrection being supposed at that time to be a purely Tagalo movement.

Conditions in Ilocano Provinces.

August 23, 1900, Captain Evans reported to General Young as follows: *—

* Contained in Diary of Events from September 22 to September 30. Received by the War Department November 5, 1900.

"Sir,— Pursuant to instructions to report on the present condition of affairs in and around Badoc, I have the honor to submit the following, which is based on personal patrols and the statements of many natives, both loyal and hostile.

"In this district there exists a secret oath-bound society, having for its objects:—

"I. 'To defend this our mother country against the American Nation.' (Quotation from constitution of the society.)

"II. 'To spy on the enemy and send information of all his movements.'

"III. 'To collect supplies through the Cabecillas, and to prevent the sale of all food, especially rice and meat.'

"IV. 'To put to death all persons who resist the objects of this society or give any information concerning it.'

"All of which is set forth in a paper captured by Major Steever, bearing the date of January 1, 1900, and signed by more than two hundred and fifty (250) men. Many of the signatures were appended at a much later date than January 1.

[*Summary of omitted portions:* Secret society aids insurgents with supplies. Some townspeople refuse help. Insurgents threaten with death all who betray them. Within six weeks telegraph wires have been cut twenty-three times, fifteen soldiers ambushed, justice of peace and three of his family, also twelve policemen, captured and believed to have been murdered.]

"The situation is not military, for the reason that these people will not fight soldiers, except in small detachments, and when taken at great disadvantage. When we patrol their barrios, they greet us in the guise of peaceful laborers. We are confronted by an organized secret conspiracy, comprising large numbers of war rebels, robbers, and murderers.

Recommendations.

"In view of these facts I recommend:—

"I. That the officers charged with abating this criminal

nuisance be given summary and plenary powers. To continue to grant these creatures the humane protection of the Laws of War is simply assisting and encouraging them in crime.

"II. That all male inhabitants of the barrios of Batac, Pacay, and Badoc be declared War Rebels. The fact that they live in these barrios is conclusive evidence that they furnish Aglipay's men with supplies and protect them by refusing to give information about them. It will be impossible to stamp out this conspiracy unless the entire community is handled in the most vigorous and summary manner.

"III. That the police of Badoc be enlisted as scouts, armed with carbines or rifles, and given the pay and allowances of our soldiers, substituting pesos for dollars. In the first place, Filipinos who will serve us faithfully can ferret out this class of criminals and bring them to justice much better than soldiers. They already know most of them, and can find out the rest if armed and supported by us.

[*Summary of omitted portions*: Police of Badoc special object of animosity, afraid to leave town to plant rice; two recently taken captives while working in the fields. We owe these people something, as they have incurred this animosity from serving us.]

"I am fully aware that these recommendations may seem radical. But the situation is most serious. This district is in a state of anarchy, with robbery and murder in supreme control.

"We can only restore peace and order by the use of the most drastic and summary measures.

"Very respectfully,

"R. K. EVANS,

"*Captain Twelfth Infantry,*

"*Commanding Second Battalion.*"

The Trouble due to Lack of Troops.

General Wheaton forwarded the above report to Manila, with the following comment:—

“I have the honor to forward herewith report of Captain R. K. Evans, Twelfth Infantry, dated August 23, 1900, on the condition of affairs in the southern part of the Province of Ilocos Norte. This report, made by an officer of many years' experience who has charge of the lines of communication between the Province of Ilocos Sur and Ilocos Norte, shows a deplorable state of affairs, but one which has always accompanied the forcible taking possession of Oriental countries by European powers. In my opinion, this condition would never have existed in these northern provinces, had the requisite number of troops been sent here in the beginning. In December, 1899, there was comparatively little rebellious feeling among the actual residents of this district. After Aguinaldo's army had been dispersed, a number of Tagalo officers and soldiers, driven north from the lower provinces, remained in the mountains and later came into the towns, and with the assistance of certain priests inflamed the people with a stronger spirit of rebellion than they had ever had. Many who had laid down their arms, and others who had joined our cause, became insurgents when it was seen that there were not enough troops for their protection. The matter was strongly represented to the military governor; and, after considerable delay, more troops were sent. Had there been as many sent in the beginning, they would in all probability have been sufficient to pacify the district; but there was so much delay in sending them that the conspiracy made great headway, and by the time they arrived more troops were needed.

“The situation now is this: There are not enough troops in the district to garrison the towns and protect those people

who wish to be our friends; the troops are nearly worn out with the amount of work they have had; it is at present out of the question to undertake proper offensive measures. More troops are needed to garrison the towns, protect the people, and take proper offensive measures. If sufficient troops were sent here, and the proposed constabulary force is established, this district can and will be pacified; but it will take more time and twice as many troops as would have been needed last December. Owing to the report industriously circulated by the leaders, that because of the war in China the United States is withdrawing troops from these islands, the conspiracy is increasing in numbers and importance in the north, and the insurgents have more confidence than they had a month ago.

Comment on Recommendations for Drastic Measures.

"Captain Evans's first recommendation [that officers "be given summary and plenary powers"] is not approved. So long as these people are recognized merely as insurgents, they are entitled to treatment according to the Laws of War. If we attempt to treat them otherwise than according to the rules of war, we shall simply be taking a backward step in civilization. The second recommendation [that all male inhabitants of certain districts "be declared War Rebels"] is not practicable. We cannot declare a whole community war rebels; and, should we do so, it would be of no effect. If any one of these inhabitants commits an act constituting him a war rebel, he is already one, and declaring him to be such would have no particular effect. Evidence would be required to convict him. The war rebel is not entitled to the privileges of a prisoner of war, but he should not ordinarily be put to death without trial. The third recommendation [that the native police be enlisted as scouts] is not approved. The police should be organized, and under municipal control, to guard the pueblo. The

native force, which may be desired for service outside of the town, should be separated from the police, and be in its nature a constabulary force."

[*Summary of omitted portion*: Police of Badoc will be organized as heretofore. Provost Judge not bound by any special law. His action may be as summary as laws of war justify. Commanding officer of province of Ilocos Norte directed to take the most stringent action known to laws of war to prevent interference with telegraph lines.]

Lieutenant Colonel Howze, in indorsing Captain Evans's statement, says: "His report is full and is concurred in. It is almost impossible to convict the guilty, because natives prefer to lie on all occasions; and they will not tell the truth even when it is plain to them, and officers know they are lying." He also states that Captain Evans has been given full control to stamp out the conspiracy among the insurgents, limited only by the Rules of War.

Conditions throughout General Young's District.

On September 7 General Young sent a telegram of some 1,700 words to Manila, which was forwarded* to Washington, General MacArthur calling the especial attention of the Secretary of War to its contents.

This report, as will be seen below, describes a new and concerted movement in Northern Luzon, imputed to Aguinaldo's initiative. It states that, "wherever an armed insurgent force makes its appearance, a general following can be obtained," and that it is dangerous to garrison any town with a detail of less than a company,—all because a sufficient number of troops have not been available for the district.

The report is as follows:—

"Official information received from the Commanding Officer of North and South Ilocos, Union, and Abra, each

* In Diary of Events from August 23 to September 21. Received by War Department October 25, 1900.

of whom derive their information from a separate and independent source, show that there is a new concerted movement being made in all the provinces in the interest of the insurgent cause. The official information is supplemented by a great many rumors current among the natives. As these movements are general and simultaneous, it indicates a common source of authority, owing to the antagonism which is known to exist between the leaders. That common source of authority is thought to be Aguinaldo.

Aguinaldo inflames the Natives to New Enthusiasm.

"It is stated by residents that his name is being used to inflame the natives with a new enthusiasm. Rumors have reached me at various times of his presence in the mountains at various points. His identity is kept as secret as possible, and certain orders which have been issued by the colonel commanding are thought to be his. Those who are favorable to the United States, even in Vigan, express much alarm on account of the notices sent out by the insurgent leaders that certain towns are to be attacked; and the garrison and the American sympathizers are warning the faithful to flee to the designated towns. There have been so many reports received, and so many people, particularly in Abra, have been thereby induced to leave their homes and join the insurgent cause that some attention should be given to these rumors. A large force of insurgents passed through Villa Vieja day before yesterday.

[*Summary of omitted portions:* Impossible to secure accurate information, but enemy's strength believed to be 200 rifles and a number of bolo-men. Wherever an armed insurgent force appears, a general following can be obtained. Civil government, which seemed so promising in Banguet, a failure,—“only 21 voted out of a population of 13,000.” Dangerous to place less than a company in a pueblo. Mountains around Banguet full of insurgents. Suggestions as to troops needed to give natives “protection they have a right to expect” as to camps and offensive operations.]

"The conditions here were not understood in Manila from the beginning, and there has never been an adequate force in the province of this district. If one-half the force which is now required could have been sent here last December, there would have been comparatively little insurrectionary feeling here. If sufficient troops could have been sent here last spring, the rebellion in this district would now have been quelled and Aguinaldo killed, captured, or driven out of the country. If sufficient troops could have been sent here three months ago, the present conspiracy would not have reached such large proportions, and much bitterness which is now certain to remain among these people after they were subdued would not have arisen.

[*Summary of omitted portions:* Troops overworked. Many sick and worn out, but all willing to continue struggle. When insurgents are crushed, surplus battalions can be dispensed with. The longer the matter is delayed, the more troops will be needed, as conspiracy is gaining in numbers, courage, and efficiency. First and Third Districts compared as to area, population, etc.]

Aguinaldo the Dominating Cause of the Difficulty.

"In addition to the native population, the troops of the First District [General Young's] have had to contend against the remnants of Aguinaldo's army, which they had driven north, and the fact that they have had to contend with the personal equation of Aguinaldo, whose presence is the dominating cause of much of the trouble. Knowing that there existed difficulties elsewhere against which the Governor-general had to contend, I have heretofore been as mild as possible in representing the situation and the need of more troops. I have worked the troops as hard as possible. They have penetrated the mountains over almost impassable trails to places Spanish troops never went, and everything has been accomplished that could be done with the means at my disposal.

"I believe on account of these increasing dangers that I

should speak plainly in the matter, and that I would fail in my duty to the government, to my overworked troops, and to the people to whom we owe protection if I did not present the situation in its true light. To abandon any territory that we are now occupying would be delivering up to insurgents for murder all natives that showed themselves friendly to us. If it is not considered advisable to send all the troops recommended, I request that two regiments be sent here to relieve the strain on the troops of this district, so as to give them rest. My present intention is to make thorough campaign in the mountains as soon as the weather and the condition of the troops will permit. It was intended to send this by mail; but, as no mail has been received from Manila for four weeks, and a typhoon is now blowing, and because of the urgency of the case, it is sent by wire."

(b) Other Districts of Northern Department.

General Funston, in command of the provinces of Principe and Nueva Ecija (lying to the south of General Young's district), reported September 21 as follows: *—

"Everything possible is being done to locate the insurgent bands in this vicinity, but so far without success. Indications are that the greater part of them have for the time being hidden their guns and returned to the barrios, though they will no doubt concentrate somewhere again before long. We are still greatly hampered by the flooded condition of the flat country, though conditions are improving in that respect. Insurgents are causing much annoyance by cutting telegraph wires. This never in the vicinity of houses, so that we cannot punish in usual way. Do not be-

* Contained in Diary of Events from August 23 to September 21. Received by the War Department October 25, 1900.

lieve they are getting much or any aid from garrisoned towns, but are living on the country." .

The commanders of the other districts in Northern Luzon did not summarize conditions at this period, but the daily reports show that there was constant activity on the part of the insurgents throughout the department.

3. Conditions in Southern Luzon.

Extent and Population.

The Department of Southern Luzon, in command September 1, 1900, of Major-General John C. Bates, comprises that portion of the island lying south of the Pasig River and of the southern boundaries of the provinces of Morong and Infanta and the adjoining islands on the coast. It will be seen from the map, page 2, that this department has a much smaller area than the northern department, and yet it has a population of something like a million and a half. The great majority of the inhabitants are Tagals, who have always been predominant in the Archipelago.

Southern Luzon was the birthplace of the revered leader, Dr. Burgos, put to death by the Spaniards in 1872; of Rizal, the Filipino hero and martyr, executed in 1896; of Aguinaldo and Trias, and many minor leaders. Since very early times it had been the hot-bed of the most important insurrections against Spain.

Unabated Insurgent Activity.

Of the general conditions of the district during the early autumn of 1900 the military reports amply bear out the Associated Press statement of September 3* that "conditions [in Southern Luzon] are far from satisfactory. Life there is not safe outside the garrison towns. Travellers

* New York *Tribune*, September 4, 1900.

are subject to ambush by guerrillas. Rarely does a day pass without an encounter between the United States troops and the insurgents or ladrones, resulting in casualties. There are 18,000 troops in that district, General Bates commanding; and in these regiments over one-third of the men are sick. The activity of the enemy increased last month. There is evidence that the insurgents have come into possession of new rifles, and that they wish to annihilate some small American garrison for the sake of political effect in the United States."

Conditions in Cavite Province.

Conditions in the thickly settled province of Cavite are shown in the "memorandum of a secret agent,"* dated September 25, 1900, which was forwarded to Washington with the comment that it "is so instructive that it is respectfully inserted herewith as embodying in condensed form the best statement of the situation in Cavite Province that has reached this office."

Inasmuch as the situation in Cavite seems to have been not unlike the situation in the other provinces of Southern Luzon, it may be taken as more or less representative of the whole department.

A Secret Service Memorandum.

[*Summary of omitted portions:* Trias in a barrio of San Francisco de Malabon, with 376 soldiers all armed with guns.]

"The soldiers sleep everywhere. This barrio is in the mountains, not far from the town. The soldiers don't stay there much. They hide their guns inside of the bamboo posts of small houses, situated in the mountains of Indang. They go to surrounding towns for food and other things, dressed in paisano clothing, without arms. They are all called together by their officer, get their guns, and make night attacks.

* Contained in Diary of Events from September 22 to September 30. Received by the War Department November 5, 1900.

[*Summary of omitted portion* : Officers seen with Trias. All had gone to a wedding. Trias is planning a conference with seven other insurgent leaders.]

“There is a man named Nicholas Fortilla, who was a commandante of the insurgent army, but now has no assignment of duty (cargo), but who always keeps up communication between the American and Filipino camps. He is a great friend of the American commander in Malabon, but the American officer does not know that he goes to the Filipino camp.

Men of Property contribute Supplies.

“Vincent Viniegra, brother of the General, is collector of moneys and supplies in San Francisco de Malabon, but is very friendly to the Americans.

“Commandante Pedro Trias, brother of the General, is collector for Tangu (Santa Cruz de Malabon). Manuel Trias, the cura of San Francisco de Malabon, is uncle to the General. He sends much money and rice to the General. The Presidente of San Francisco de Malabon, Diego Mojica, also collects money for the General.

“In the time of the Spaniards all of this section of country paid tribute to the Freiles, who are the owners of the land. Now, as nothing is paid to the Freiles or Americans, the Curate collects this tribute and pays part of it to the insurgents.

“In Salinas there is a very rich man who is called Captain Mariano. His appellido (last name) is Ponsalan. He sends money to General Trias also.

[*Summary of omitted portion* : Insurgent troops discouraged. Officers go about like poor people, without shoes or arms. Trias has about 500 men in Cavite Province. His brother-in-law, Luis Ferrara, is his treasurer.]

Desire for Independence.

“The people in Cavite want independence. If they cannot get that, they want armed autonomy for ten or twelve

years, and then independence. They say they will never give up their arms and surrender if they cannot get what they want. The people are told by the leaders that the Americans haven't got any more soldiers to send here; that they haven't got enough for China and the Philippines both. The people do not hate the Americans: they truly did not have any great hatred of the Spanish soldiers only once in a while, when they treated them cruelly and killed many innocent people. Then they hated them for a little while, but their objection was to Freiles. The Americans are better than the Spaniards. The Spaniards never paid for what they took; they never cured the wounded; and, when they captured a prisoner, they treated them badly, starved them, and put them in dungeons. The Americans never do this. They capture prisoners, and turn them loose in a few days. For this reason the Filipinos do not fear capture by the Americans. They always pay for what they take: they spend their money liberally in the towns, and the Filipinos appreciate this as an advantage for themselves. They always cure the wounded, and feed and treat their prisoners well, and put them in good places to confine them. For these reasons the people have truly much friendship for the Americans, have no prejudice or hatred. Never do they fight for vengeance, because they don't feel vengeful. They fight because they want their liberty and their rights.

Good Will toward American Soldiers.

"All the Filipinos in Cavite, men, women, and children, have much respect for the American forces. They like them. There are many balls, and they like to have the Americans come to them. The Filipino officers, including the generals, go about in the sight of the Americans; but the Americans do not know them. They are dressed like poor people. Trias has very great influence in Cavite, even with the children: nobody will tell on him. He does not stay in one place, but sometimes in one town, sometimes in

another; but he stays most of the time at Maic. General Licerio has promised him supplies from Manila, but he wants to see him about it at the conference. This is to take place after that time. General Trias is thirty-two years of age; has a wife and two children who live in Santa Cruz del Malabon, when they are not with him. He has no mistress, never has had, and does not want any. He is a good man, and his wife belongs to a good family.

Trias and Aguinaldo.

“General Trias is much beloved by the people of Cavite, who have great confidence in him. He has more influence in Cavite than Aguinaldo, but is friendly to Aguinaldo and loyal to him, and has the same idea. Many of the other generals no longer like Aguinaldo, but they all respect Trias. If the latter is caught, the revolution will be lost. All the people of Cavite Viejo are partisans of Aguinaldo. There he has more influence than anybody else. It is his home, but the other towns in Cavite prefer Trias.

“Mascado is a native of Cavite Province, but, because he is known to be a strong partisan of Aguinaldo, is afraid to return home. The people are prejudiced against Aguinaldo because of his acts. He has given places to all of his relatives, and permitted some of them to act very badly. Besides, they think that Aguinaldo has not the head to manage well; that, if he had good political sense, he would have managed the revolution so the people would not have suffered such loss of property and loss of life. They think Trias would have done better, had he been at the head of the government; but Trias tells them to be patient. He is loyal to Aguinaldo. The majority of the Cavitanos don't want to fight any more; but they have confidence in Trias, and keep up the struggle because he tells them to. When he is gone, there will be no more revolution in Cavite. They would not continue for any one else. Inside of Imus the people are very loyal to the Americans and like them,

but in the barrios they are not. The Americans can't protect them in the barrios, and they are afraid of the insurgents. In Bacoar there are still many insurgents. In Cavite Viejo all are insurgents, because they are partisans of Aguinaldo; but in Novaleta they are good people and feel friendly to the Americans, but are afraid of the insurgents. In the other towns in Cavite it is about the same way. The people like the Americans, but fear the insurgents. All of them want independence.

"Aguinaldo's wife does not live with his mother in Cavite Viejo, but went to her own mother's house in Alapan, a barrio of Imus, to have a baby. A few weeks ago some men robbed her of several thousand dollars and a lot of jewelry. It is well known to everybody that she was robbed, but nobody knows who did it. There are many who think that General Noriel had his soldiers rob her; but everybody is afraid that, if they said so, Noriel would order the soldiers to shoot them.

"I don't know where General Aguinaldo is. I don't think any one in Cavite knows, but the messengers who have come from him come from Nueva Viscaya. This province, they think, is his fixed residence, but that he makes journeys sometimes. According to the rumor he has been in Nueva Ecija and Bulacan; and it is also stated that he came from Bulacan to Cavite, and then to Manila, where he was in the house of Mariano Linjap and Tonas Guison, who lives in Calle Dolores. I don't think Aguinaldo expects to be at the conference of the generals.

[*Summary of omitted portions:* Inference that conference is about proposed attack on Manila. Filipinos do not think they can take the city itself, but really believe they can take the suburbs.]

Desperate Straits for Ammunition.

"The insurgents have not much ammunition. They have none that is new, cannot buy any; but they can buy lead from almost any Chino in Manila. They get little pieces

of lead from beer corks and all kind of places, and melt it up in a lump, and then sell it at a high price to the insurgents. The insurgents make balls out of it. They cannot buy any powder, but make that, too. It is very bad, and only about half of the cartridges explode. They have a small maestranza somewhere between Silang and Indang. I have heard them say that they had lost three thousand guns by having them buried in the ground to hide them. They have not now more than five hundred good guns in the province of Cavite."

4. Conditions in the Visayan Islands.

Extent and Population.

The Visayan group (in command September 1, 1900, of Brigadier-general Robert P. Hughes) lies to the south of Luzon, as will be seen on the map, page 2; the islands of the group are Panay, Cebu, Negros, Samar, Leyte, Bohol, and Bacolod. The inhabitants of the islands are called Visayans, and approximate two millions in number.

Men of Property vs. Men in Arms.

On August 16 General Hughes reported as follows: * —

"It is submitted that a general inclination to go to work seems to prevail in all the islands of this department except Leyte. This does not mean by any means that the war faction has ceased its efforts,—far from it. It is not safe for three men to go out on any road in either Panay or Cebu; but, as a general thing, ten well-equipped men, by exercise of caution, can go almost anywhere if they do not allow it to be known that they are going, and when they do not return, or, if they do so, that some other route is taken.

* Contained in the Diary of Events from August 23 to September 21. Received by War Department October 25, 1900.

To attack a party of ten, it requires more time than is given for the natives to be warned, get into their uniforms, hunt out their rifles, and assemble in sufficient force for an attack, with any promise of success; but with three men or less they seem able to prepare a surprise on short notice.

[*Summary of omitted portions*: Details of two such attacks.]

"If bridges were built, they would burn them down, as they have done in the few instances where we have had to build. But the residentes are rebuilding their homes in Iloilo; and many new business structures are being erected, so that every carpenter and mason in the civil community is employed. The men of property are a unit in favor of peace, and they are willing to take the best terms they can get to secure it. But the people with rifles are just as persistent as they were fourteen months ago. They cannot accomplish anything; but 'attrition' is now the announced method, and some of these islands are exceedingly well adapted for just such murderous partisan warfare.

[*Summary of omitted portions*: Details concerning expeditions, native troops, etc.]

"Some of the leading Filipinos of Iloilo suggested that they would like to organize a town government in order to receive the civil commission when it visited the Visayas, and they are now preparing for an election."

Growing Desire for Peace in Panay.

October 19 General Hughes supplemented his former report in part, as follows: *—

"The general condition of the Department seems to be improving. The main improvement to my mind is not on the surface, for these things are just where they were five months ago; but it is in a general apathy on the part of the

* Contained in Diary of Events from October 15 to October 31. Received by War Department December 7, 1900.

natives themselves. There is no doubt of the fact that there is a large per centum of that class of the people who wear shoes that wish the present state of lawlessness should cease, and that they might again feel that what is still remaining of their possessions is surely their own. By gradually pinching the insurrectos they have been forced to totally disregard personal and property rights, even with their friends, which has done them more damage than all our shooting."

5. Department of Mindanao and Jolo.

The Department of Mindanao and Jolo (in command of General Kobbé) comprises the Sulu Archipelago (population about 100,000) and the large island of Mindanao, whose population is unknown. Except for a small number of Visayans living in the coast towns of Mindanao, the island is inhabited by Moros and wild tribes. These Moros were included in the treaty which our government made with the Sultan of Sulu; and, consequently, the Moros of Mindanao warmly favored American occupation.

The Visayans of Mindanao, however, had kept up hostilities until October, 1900. At that time General Kobbé, who had been campaigning vigorously for some months, had almost effected the surrender of the insurrecto leader. On October 25, however, a letter was received from General Doloso,* in command of the hostile forces, which stated that the writer had in his possession "many copies of letters of eminent gentlemen of different parts of the North American Republic, announcing the surety of triumph of Mr. Bryan's candidacy, and adding that if his overthrow should succeed, and the said Bryan should not be able to ascend to the Presidency of the United States, then each party would

* Contained in Diary of Events from November 1 to November 14. Received by the War Department December 17, 1900.

desire to be governed by its own self. This class of opinions makes it easy, and surely civil war will happen in that great Republic." Therefore, the writer continues,—

"The opinion of the Philippine government and all its servants would be not to agree to peace to the honor of Mr. McKinley, but only for the honor of Bryan; and for this same reason there are now found great preparations for armament in the Philippines, because the Filipinos prefer to accept the condition of being slaves of any other nation than being slaves of Mr. McKinley, he being such a great enemy to the Filipinos."

This letter ended all talk of General Doloso's surrender at that time.

The Moros Growing Uneasy.

A summary of conditions,* written early in November, states:—

"The Moros, heretofore docile and very quiet, are manifesting considerable restlessness in the belief that we are soon to leave the islands. They do not wish us to go, but are preparing to grab their share of the island of Mindanao, if such an event should happen, which they are persuaded is very likely to be the case. General Kobbé describes the island as similar to a powder magazine, likely to explode; but, with proper precautions and careful handling, he regards the situation as quite safe. In this respect the commands could not be in better hands. General Kobbé knows the situation, and his discriminating judgment and splendid zeal for the service insure the situation against every possible contingency that can be foreseen by human sagacity and provided against by thoughtful arrangement."

* Contained in Diary of Events from November 1 to November 14. Received by the War Department December 17, 1900.

6. Pre-election and Post-election Figures.

The following comparative figures* are of interest as additional evidence that the United States electoral campaign was a controlling influence in the insurrection.

Daily reports of minor commands during September and October record 241 engagements,† of which 52 were aggressive on the part of the insurgents. During November and December, 198 engagements are recorded, of which 27 were aggressive on the part of the insurgents; that is, a decrease of 50 per cent. in insurgent attacks during the latter two months.

The following tables ‡ furnish similar evidence:—

<i>Insurgent Casualties.</i>	<i>September.</i>	<i>October.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
Killed	556	422	978
Wounded	137	68	205
Captured	440	173	613
Surrendered	15	39	54
Arms captured	261	163	424
Arms surrendered	12	6	18
Ammunition captured	7,701	20,148	27,849
Ammunition surrendered	0	0	0
<i>Insurgent Casualties.</i>	<i>November.</i>	<i>December.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
Killed	376	331	707
Wounded	236	153	389
Captured	686	749	1,434
Surrendered	323	2,212	2,534
Arms captured	208	278	486
Arms surrendered	14	33	47
Ammunition captured	31,780	18,103	49,883
Ammunition surrendered	0	389	389

* Compiled from Chronological List of Events in the Philippine Islands and China, on file at the War Department.

† Scouting parties in addition to the above are described where arms were captured or supplies or camps destroyed, but where it is not apparent that there was fighting.

‡ Taken from tables of Insurgent Casualties, etc., on file at the War Department.

The significant feature of the above tables is the total number of surrenders for September and October (54) as against the number for November and December (2,534).

These figures certainly justify the prophecy that there would be a decrease in insurgent activities should the policy of retaining the Philippines be sustained in the Presidential election of November 7; yet, as subsequent reports prove, the figures by no means indicate a collapse of insurgent opposition to American rule.

II. DRASTIC MEASURES.

1. Policy Inaugurated in November.

On November 9, 1900, the United States press reported as follows: "Combined operations of the army and navy planned. Orders for return of volunteers suspended, and vigorous campaign mapped out. Progress toward pacification expected." *

The Associated Press correspondent in Manila, reporting an interview with General MacArthur November 21, says in part, as follows:† —

70,000 Troops now Available.

"General MacArthur was asked to-day whether the result of the Presidential election in the United States was in any way responsible for the orders to push operations against the Filipinos. He replied that the result of the election was merely coincident with other features of the situation. He added that the return of the soldiers and marines from China, with the recruits who had arrived recently, would increase the number of troops to 70,000 men. The enlargement of the forces, the ending of the rainy season, better roads, improved transportation, and the desire to make the most efficient use of the volunteers before their term of service expires in June are all contributory to the more active campaign.

"Concerning the replacing of 35,000 volunteers, General MacArthur said he favors the establishment of a standing army of 75,000 men, and authority to the President to increase it to 100,000 men.

* New York *Tribune*, November 9, 1900.

† *Ibid.*, November 22, 1900.

"The General also said he was enlarging the force in General Young's district to nearly 7,000 men; that heavy re-enforcements were being sent to General Hughes in the island of Panay; that more troops had been ordered to Southern Luzon, and that various column movements had been planned."

2. Results of New Policy.

On December 3, General MacArthur cabled to Washington * as follows:—

"Two thousand one hundred and eighty Katapunan insurgents, whom Consegue enrolled (bolo-men), came from mountains and surrendered to General Samuel B. M. Young to-day at Santa Marie. (They) Renounced insurrection and swore allegiance to the United States. The oath was administered by the padre (priest) at the church, with impressive religious ceremonies. General Young attributes the surrender to President's re-election and vigorous prosecution of the war. Although no rifles were surrendered, this is important, as indicating a reaction among the peoples."

Moneyed Classes Recognize Futility of Resistance.

On December 10, General Hughes (in command of the Visayans) reported as follows:†—

"So far as we can tell, things seem to be improving in this Department; and the indications are that Panay will assume a condition semi-peaceable in a short time. The people of good morals and of intelligence have seen the futility of their effort, and are now disposed to quit and

* On file at War Department.

† Contained in Diary of Events from November 30 to December 14. Received by War Department January 12, 1901.

wait for a more auspicious time and more favorable conditions to continue their efforts. The moneyed men wish it to cease, because the demands on their resources are growing heavier, more frequent, and are becoming too burdensome to suit their fancy. The fact is they find their 'ideals' are high-priced, and they do not have the dinero. Ten thousand of the householders and heads of families have taken the oath of allegiance to the United States in the province of Iloilo in the past ten days. The men of position and financial standing are actively working for a cessation of the useless struggle, but my opinion is that the fellows in arms have gotten beyond all control of the home authorities, and they will continue to struggle as outlaws for some time yet. They have taken refuge in those sections of the mountains where robber bands have made their homes for two centuries, and have been a constant menace to industry and life on the island.

[*Summary of omitted portion*: Malaria among soldiers, etc.]

"The tracing out of the lines of the money supply has gone steadily on, and we have now from 30,000 to 40,000 of the insurrecto funds in our possession, which may make some difference in their plans."

[*Summary of omitted portion*: Nothing doing in Negros; nothing of note in Cebu; nothing new from First District.]

3. More Stringent Measures Needed.

It soon became apparent, however, that these encouraging reports by no means indicated that the struggle was ended.* General Hughes, who December 10 had felt so hopeful,

* In this connection the following item is of interest:—

"London, December 10.—'Trustworthy mail advices from Manila show that the position of the Americans is becoming increasingly hopeless,' says the Hongkong correspondent of the *Daily Mail*. 'Money is freely subscribed to purchase arms and ammunition that are imported for the insurgents. The

reported December 19* that "the situation has been and is now somewhat acute, and it is about as unsafe to prophesy the future here as it would be any year on the result of the election in Connecticut."

Whole Population Insurrectos from "Hide to Heart."

Writing December 25, General Hughes says:† "The situation is still very dark, but sometimes I think it is the darkness before the dawn," and further "careful management of the situation now gives me some anxiety. The whole population has been rank insurgents from hide to heart, and all have been contributing to the support of the cause in one way or another according to their ability."

Unity among Natives.

General MacArthur seems to have fully realized that the condition of affairs described in his report of October 1, 1900,—namely, an "almost complete unity of action of the entire native population,"—had not been materially altered by the Filipino surrenders during November and the first part of December.

The chief difficulty before the election had been that the towns under United States control supported the insurrection. Without that support, General MacArthur believed that the insurrection must almost immediately collapse. No doubt many of the contributions by Filipinos who were not openly opposing American rule, were impelled by violence on the part of the men in arms. Indeed, it was Judge Taft's belief that these contributions were wholly

Americans will never capture the rebel contraband running vessels. While, in order to flatter the official view that trade is flourishing, goods are permitted to be freely imported into Manila, they are distributed from that point to the insurgents, who are murdering all native sympathizers with Americans."

* Contained in Diary of Events from December 14 to December 29. Received by War Department February 9, 1901.

† *Ibid.*

compelled by fear. One must, however, admit the logic of General MacArthur's statement that "fear, as the only motive, is hardly sufficient to account for the united and apparently spontaneous action of several millions of people."

Occupied Towns still support Insurrection.

Whatever the cause, it is certain that the support furnished the insurrection by occupied towns was practically universal, and did not cease after the result of the election became known. Colonel Thompson reported* that, in the provinces to the east of Manila during the months after the election, "in most, if not in all towns of the district the insurgents carry on a local government, and that in many instances the same people hold office under the American direction and also under the so-called insurgent government."

He added: "It is believed that with a very few exceptions all of the local officials who have been acting under the commanding officers have been, at worst, active insurgent sympathizers, or, at best, very lukewarm in their support of American rule. *The cause of this attitude is too well known to need comment.*" (In the original report this sentence is underlined in red ink.)†

Insurgent letters captured during December show that a certain J. Dayritt, in the employ of the American government, was sending money and supplies to Alejandrino, insurgent commander in Northern Luzon. General MacArthur, in forwarding these documents to Washington, calls attention to the fact that they "illustrate very well the theory of double administration now existing in towns through-

* Contained in Diary of Events from December 29 to January 12. Received by the War Department March 5, 1901.

† General Wheaton, in forwarding this report, explained that "the cause" referred to in the underlined sentence was threefold: first, the arrant cowardice of the natives who feared the insurgents, and did not fear the authority of the United States; second, the innate love of treachery of all Tagalos; third, the belief on the part of the natives that the United States was not in the Philippines to stay.

out the archipelago as described in the last annual report of this division." *

Obviously, the support given the insurrection by peaceful towns could be ended only in one of two ways. Either the majority of the people must genuinely desire American rule or they must be deterred by fear from contributing to the insurgent cause.

4. Stringent Measures Adopted.

There was little hope that the lenient policy so far pursued would bring about the former alternative. Of necessity, therefore, General MacArthur chose the latter alternative. On December 20, 1900, he issued a proclamation †

* Contained in Diary of Events from December 14 to December 29. Received by War Department February 9, 1901.

† MANILA, P.I., December 20, 1900.

"PROCLAMATION.

"In the armed struggle against the sovereign power of the United States now in progress in these islands, frequent violations of important provisions of the laws of war have recently manifested themselves, rendering it imperative, while rejecting every consideration of belligerency of those opposing the government in the sense in which the term belligerency is generally accepted and understood, to remind all concerned of the existence of these laws, that exemplary punishments attach to the infringement thereof, and that their strict observance is required, not only by combatant forces, but as well by non-combatants, native or alien, residing within occupied places.

"In pursuance of this purpose, reference is made to the following provisions of the laws of war as most essential for consideration under present conditions:—

"1. A place, district, or country occupied in consequence of regular military operations by an organized combatant force stands, by reason of said occupation, under the martial law of the occupying army. The commanding general owes protection to all people residing within the places occupied who perform with fidelity the duties imposed upon them, from which consideration results the obligation upon the part of the people and civil officials of the occupied territory of strict obedience to the commanding general of the occupying force.

"The present necessity for allusion to the laws of war arises from the fact

declaring a more stringent policy. To insure "unrelenting and rigid enforcement of the terms of the proclamation,"

that many proclamations recently issued by insurgent commanders threaten punishment against all native inhabitants of occupied places who accept the reciprocal relations above described; and from the further fact that in prosecution of this policy the mandates of insurgent officers to kidnap and to assassinate residents of occupied towns have been successfully executed. It cannot, therefore, be too emphatically declared that all engaged in such transactions, from the authority making the proclamation to the parties of execution, are, collectively and individually, guilty of violation of the laws of war, and must eventually answer for murder or such other crime as may result from their unlawful actions.

"Notice is accordingly given to insurgent leaders already committed to or who may be contemplating such a system of war that the practice thereof will necessarily terminate the possibility of those engaging therein returning to normal civic relations in the Philippines. That is to say, persons charged with violation of the laws of war above enumerated must sooner or later be tried for felonious crimes, with all the attending possibilities of conviction, or as an only means of escape therefrom must become fugitive criminals beyond the jurisdiction of the United States, which, in effect, means lifelong expatriation.

"2. Persons residing within an occupied place who do things inimical to the interests of the occupying army are known as war rebels, or war traitors, according to the nature of their overt acts, and are punishable at the discretion of the tribunals of the occupying army. To comply with demands of an expelled public enemy and make no report thereof, creates the presumption that the act is voluntary and malicious. In such a case a plea of intimidation can rarely be accepted. The plain duty of people so threatened is to report the facts, which must by reason of a common language be of knowledge to a large part of the resident community, and thereby avert suspicion as to their own good faith, and enable the commanding general to act efficiently in behalf of their protection. When, however, as is known to be the case in many places occupied by United States troops, secret committees are permitted to exist and to act in behalf of the so-called insurgent government by collecting supplies, recruiting men, and sending military information to the insurgent camps, it is not only difficult to afford adequate protection, but the well-disposed people who, from a sense of timidity or misplaced sympathy for neighbors, persist in screening these committees, in effect, offer themselves as easy victims to be plundered and murdered, and also expose themselves to the danger of being classified and tried as war traitors against the United States.

"The principal object of this proclamation is to instruct all classes throughout the archipelago as to the requirements of the laws of war in respect of the particulars herein referred to, and to advise all concerned of the purpose to exact, in the future, precise compliance therewith. The practice of sending supplies to insurgent troops from places occupied by the United States, as is

instructions were issued through General Barry, General

now the case, must cease. If contumacious or faint-hearted persons continue to engage in this traffic, they must be prepared to answer for their actions under the penalties declared in this article.

"3. The remarks embodied in the foregoing article 2 apply with special force to the city of Manila, which is well-known as a rendezvous from which an extensive correspondence is distributed to all parts of the archipelago by sympathizers with and by emissaries of the insurrection. All persons in Manila or elsewhere are again reminded that the entire archipelago, for the time being, is necessarily under the rigid restraints of martial law, and that any contribution of advice, information, or supplies, and all correspondence the effect of which is to give aid, support, encouragement, or comfort to the armed opposition in the field, are flagrant violations of American interests, and persons so engaged are warned to conform to the laws which apply to occupied places as herein set forth.

"The newspapers and other periodicals of Manila, being of issue in an occupied place, are specially admonished that any article published in the midst of such martial environment which by any construction can be classed as seditious must be regarded as intended to injure the army of occupation, and as subjecting all connected with the publication to such punitive action as may be determined by the undersigned.

"4. Men who participate in hostilities without being part of a regularly organized force, and without sharing continuously in its operations, but who do so with intermittent returns to their homes and avocations, divest themselves of the character of soldiers, and, if captured, are not entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war.

"It is well known that many of the occupied towns support and encourage men who habitually assume the semblance of peaceful pursuits, but who have arms hidden outside of the towns, and periodically slip out to take part in guerrilla war.

"The fact that such men have not heretofore been held responsible for their actions is simply an evidence of the solicitude of the United States to avoid all appearance of harshness in pacifying the islands, and not of any defect in the law itself. The people of the archipelago are now instructed as to the precise nature of the law applicable in such cases, and are warned to mistrust leaders who not only require soldiers to expose themselves to the ordinary vicissitudes of campaign, but insist upon duties that necessarily expose all who engage therein to the possibility of trial for a capital offence.

"War in its earliest form was an act of violence which, from the very nature of primitive humanity and of the forces employed, knew no bounds. Mankind, from the beginning of civilization, however, has tried to mitigate and to escape, as far as possible, from the consequences of this barbarous conception of warlike action; and to that end conventions have been held from time to time for international discussion of the customs and usages of war, in the hope that some means might be devised to regulate by rule the beneficent in-

MacArthur's Chief of Staff, to Department Commanders, as follows: * —

"The Division Commander desires to invite particular attention to the proclamation issued from this office on the 20th inst., the practical effect of which is to declare a new and more stringent policy in respect of certain problems connected with the suppression of the insurrection.

"The Division Commander is strongly of the opinion, that one of the most effective means of prolonging the struggle, now left in the hands of the insurgent leaders, is the organized system by which supplies and information are sent to them from occupied towns. Principal purpose, therefore, is to interrupt, and, if possible, completely destroy this system: to which end you are requested to supplement the proclamation by such orders and advice to commanding officers in the field as will be best calculated to accomplish that purpose.

[*Summary of omitted portion*: All the people of the pueblo to be under surveillance, and those suspected of contraband traffic with insurgents to be arrested and sent to Manila.]

Those who are not with Us are against Us.

"In carrying out this policy, it is safe to assume that all prominent families, that have not by some public action or declaration committed themselves to American interests,

instincts of humanity. As a consequence of such conferences, a code has slowly evolved, which, although uncertain in many particulars, contains certain fundamental principles, which have been accepted and are now insisted upon by the public opinion of the world. The articles discussed in this paper have been adopted by all civilized nations. Their careful perusal by the people, it is hoped, will induce all who are eager for the tranquillization of the archipelago to combine for mutual protection and united action in behalf of their own interests and the welfare of the country.

"ARTHUR MACARTHUR,

"Major-general, U. S. Volunteers,

"United States Military Governor in the Philippines."

* Contained in Diary of Events from December 29 to January 12. Received by War Department March 5, 1901.

are, either willingly, or under compulsion, engaged in, or, at all events, know those, who are employed in this business; and, as a consequence, if not principals themselves, they are accessories to the entire transaction.

"Great importance is attached to preventing the insurgents thus using the towns as bases, as it is believed that when this is effectually accomplished the armed rebellion in the fields will soon subside. In conclusion the Division Commander desires to remark that whenever action is necessary the more drastic the application the better, provided only that unnecessary hardships and personal indignities shall not be imposed upon persons arrested, and that the laws of war are not violated in any respect touching the treatment of prisoners."

[*Summary of omitted portion* : Ten thousand copies of the proclamation delivered with this communication, to be as extensively circulated as possible.]

The instructions given the District Commanders* by the Department Commanders stated that, "In case it is impossible to find convincing proof that they (peaceful inhabitants) have been assisting the enemy, but there is a suspicion amounting to moral certainty, that such is the case, they will be arrested and a report of the matter sent to these headquarters, with recommendations as to the advisability of releasing them on condition that they voluntarily took the oath of allegiance to the government of the United States.

Excuse of Fear no longer Accepted.

"No excuse on the part of an arrested person that he contributed to the insurgent cause, either in money, supplies, or military service, under compulsion and through fear of personal harm, will be accepted. The natives must be made

* Contained in Diary of Events from December 29 to January 12. Received by War Department March 5, 1901.

to feel that compliance with insurgent demands will be as dangerous as refusal."

General Bell, the Provost Marshall General in Manila, instructed all the officers under his command as follows:*

"It is well known to all that the American government has pursued a mild and lenient policy in these islands. I have frequently heard the opinion expressed that no good has been accomplished by this policy. I cannot concur in that opinion, for I feel convinced that this policy has had a good effect. Had we been building for a day only, or solely in order to put an end to hostilities, a different policy might have been indicated; but the fact has not been lost sight of that we have got to continue to live among these people. We have got to govern them. Government by force alone cannot be satisfactory to Americans. It is desirable that a government be established in time which is based upon the will of the governed. This can be accomplished satisfactorily only by obtaining and retaining the good will of the people. In view of these considerations, avoiding the arousing of race hatred (always long-lived) became quite desirable and important. Our policy heretofore was calculated to prevent the birth of undying resentment and hatred. This policy has earned for us the respect and approval of a large majority of the more intelligent and influential portion of the community. We cannot lose their support by now adopting such measures as may be necessary to suppress the irreconcilable and disorderly.

"Although this policy has had a good effect on many, it has failed to arouse sufficient appreciation to materially affect the acts of those still continuing and aiding and abetting the insurrection. Necessity has been plainly seen for some time for measures better calculated to restrain and put an end to the operations of this portion of the population.

* Contained in Diary of Events from December 29 to January 12. Received by War Department March 5, 1901.

A Counter-reign of Fear must be created.

"It is the purpose and earnest desire of the Division Commander to institute a rigidly stringent policy toward all persons referred to in his proclamation. Without altogether ignoring the dictates of justice and without transgressing the well-known laws of self-restraint imposed by civilization in connection with operations of war, it is desired to create a reign of fear and anxiety among the disaffected which will become unbearable, in the hope that they will be thereby brought to their senses and accept the reasonable assurances which have been given them in order to escape from the effect of such a blight.

"It is but natural that, when we have long lived in peace and pleasant friendly relations with those surrounding us who make many protestations of loyalty, we should have our doubts and sympathies aroused when we come to experience the unavoidable consequences of a radically different and very stringent policy, inevitably accompanied by its train of individual hardship and suspicion. But personal considerations and personal views and friendships must assume a place entirely subordinate to the requirements of a conscientious and zealous enforcement of a policy which will undoubtedly be beneficent in its consequences. Let sympathy and loyalty to friends, both admirable qualities, be suppressed when found to be in conflict with duty and loyalty to our chief, and be sustained by the conviction that you will thereby do the greatest good to the greatest number. Don't permit doubt or disagreeableness to swerve you from the determination to follow vigorously the policy prescribed for you, any more than a father would be deterred from giving distasteful medicine to a sick child because it was disagreeable to witness its distress.

"This is all I have to say, except that I expect all officers individually and collectively to make this effort the

most important consideration of their duty, and to begin operations at once! Don't wait; but begin now, right away."

5. Deportation of Prisoners.

General MacArthur, believing it to be "expedient to emphasize the new policy by every possible means," cabled the War Department, in cipher, December 25, as follows: * —

"Expectations based on result of election have not been realized. Progress of pacification apparent to me, but still very slow. Condition very inflexible and likely to become chronic. I have therefore initiated a more rigid policy by issue of proclamation, enjoining precise observance of laws of war, with special reference to sending supplies and information to enemy in the field from towns occupied by our troops, and also warning leaders that intimidation of natives by kidnapping or assassination must sooner or later lead to their trial for felonious crimes, unless they become fugitive criminals beyond the jurisdiction of the United States, which latter course would mean lifelong expatriation. Proclamation well received, but country expectant and awaiting practical application thereof. Am considering expediency of closing ports of both Camarines, Albay, Samar, and Leyte. Would like to emphasize new policy by deporting to Guam at early date a few prominent leaders now in my hands. Request authority accordingly. Pro-American natives, Manila, with chief justice at the head, have organized party, which, apparently, has some element of cohesion and usefulness. Field movements outlined in my message of October 26 will probably be somewhat interrupted by early return of volunteers. It is difficult to con-

* Senate Document 135, Fifty-sixth Congress, Second Session, page 2.

vince people, especially natives, that any of the volunteers will be replaced. Early information of purpose of Department in regard to army legislation, and the prospect of the passage of an army bill, would greatly strengthen my administration here."

Deportation of Leaders Authorized.

The following day Adjutant General Corbin replied to General MacArthur as follows: * —

"Secretary War authorizes you to deport insurgent leaders to Guam. Send them under orders to deliver to the custody of naval officer in command, who will be instructed by Secretary of Navy to receive and keep. Secretary War does not approve closing ports in Camarines, Albay, Samar, and Leyte."

Accordingly, on January 7, General MacArthur issued an order † stating that, "In pursuance of authority obtained from the War Department by cable, under date of December 27, 1900, the following-named persons, whose overt act has clearly revealed them as in aid of or in sympathy with the insurrection, the irregular guerrilla warfare by which it is being maintained, and whose continued residence in these islands would, in every essential regard, be inimical to the pacification thereof, will be deported at the earliest practicable date to the island of Guam, there to be in surveillance or in actual custody, as circumstance may require, during the further progress of hostilities, and until such time as the restoration of normal peace conditions in the Philippines has resulted in a public declaration of the termination of such hostilities."

The persons named were five general officers, four colonels, four lieutenant colonels, one major, four subordinate

* Senate Document 135, Fifty-sixth Congress, Second Session, page 3.

† Contained in Diary of Events from January 30 to February 15. Received by War Department March 18, 1901.

officers, and fourteen civil officers and insurgent sympathizers.*

Apolinario Mabini.

Among the deported prisoners was A. Mabini,† the most interesting figure, after Aguinaldo, among the insurgent leaders. An enthusiast by nature, he headed the extreme faction in Aguinaldo's cabinet. General Otis thus describes him: ‡ —

* The thirty-two prisoners deported January 26 were put in charge of Major Henry B. Orwig, whose commands were to extend to the prisoners every liberty and consideration consistent with their safe keeping. The prisoners' letters were to be examined, and only such be permitted to pass as related exclusively to domestic affairs. Among the prisoners was General Artemio Ricarte, mentioned in "A Period of Guerrilla Warfare."

† According to *Harper's Weekly* of May 26, 1900, Mabini was born of humble parents, secured his early education in a village school, and earned his way through the College of San Juan de Letran. Early in the rebellion of 1896 he was arrested by the Spanish government and held in prison for nine months without a hearing or a trial. Upon his release he lost no time in casting his lot with the insurgents. He was among the first to join Aguinaldo when the insurrection was renewed in 1898. He is the reputed author of many of the abler insurgent papers, and two documents bearing his signature are notable literary productions. The *Manila Freedom* of September 27, 1901, comments as follows: —

"Señor Mabini still remains in Anda Street [jail], and he is slowly failing in health. He is as firm in his resolve to stand by the revolutionary cause as ever, and refuses to take the oath of allegiance. When he was removed to Anda Street, he seemed totally paralyzed and more helpless physically than ever. His misfortune has weighed heavily upon him, and he has often spoken of the future of his family. He gambled everything he had in the insurrection, and from being a well-to-do Filipino he has very little left. Peace would repair his fortunes; but, with a tenacity that is surprising to one who is a complete physical wreck, he sticks to his belief in the ultimate success of the insurgent cause. He has been named by Aguinaldo as his representative in Manila, and he has been authorized again and again to propose terms of peace. He has never gotten further than the independence clause in his proposal. That he hitches onto, and sticks there."

The story runs that Mabini was called upon by the Taft Commission to advise in the framing of the Philippine tariff, and that he refused to assist in the matter, saying, "According to my code, taxation without representation is unjust."

‡ Senate Document 432, Fifty-sixth Congress, First Session.

"Mabini was the master spirit, able, radical, uncompromising. He furnished the brains which made Aguinaldo's cabinet formidable. He was brought before me recently, paralytic and a prisoner. I offered him his freedom on parole not to stir up trouble. He hesitated, and said, 'I have not changed my convictions.'

"I told him that I did not respect him the less on that account, and repeated the offer.

"'I have no means of support. I cannot put my freedom to any use,' he replied."

In response to an inquiry of the Senate, when the news of his deportation reached this country, General MacArthur cabled: * —

"Mabini deported: a most active agitator; persistently and defiantly refusing amnesty, and maintaining correspondence with insurgents in the field while living in Manila, Luzon, under the protection of the United States; also, for offensive statement in regard to recent proclamation enforcing the laws of war. His deportation absolutely essential."

Dread of Deportation.

The following statement from General Bates† (in command of the Southern Department) illustrates the effect of deportation upon the natives:—

"Natives in vicinity (of Manbau) much disturbed about rumors that prisoners of war are being sent to island of Guam. Similar rumors received from different parts of the Department indicate that natives are greatly in dread of deportation."

* Senate Document 135, Fifty-sixth Congress, Second Session.

† *Ibid.*

Outlook in January.

The military reports for January show that, while the more stringent policy had produced a good effect, yet General Young's District was still in a critical condition. December 28 General Young reported * that, although conditions had improved in his district (the north-western provinces), yet trouble was sure to follow the withdrawal of the troops soon to occur, as the insurgents could and would collect at any time. The detailed report is as follows:—

[*Summary of omitted portion*: Results of election reassuring effect in convincing both sides that United States will probably remain in Philippines. Re-enforcements and "unceasing scouring of mountain trails" have had discouraging effect on insurgents. Comparatively few guns captured. Although insurgent commands have been broken up, they can be called together wherever leaders deem it advantageous.]

Number of Troops must not be Diminished.

"There is no doubt that, if the force here should be materially reduced, these scattered small bands would join together and take revenge on those towns and people who have shown themselves friendly to us.

"The insurgents are fully informed of all our perplexities, and are now awaiting for that favorable opportunity to arrive when the withdrawal of the volunteers leave many towns defenceless.

"In the beginning the majority of these people were not in favor of the insurrection, as they regarded it as a Tagalo affair; and, if sufficient troops had been sent here last January, the insurrection would never have been so formidable as it is and has been. In the month of October there was probably four times as many warm insurgent sympathizers as in last January. The Tagalos, who had been driven from the south, joined by a few active and aggressive Ilocano

* Contained in Diary of Events from December 29 to January 12. Received by War Department March 5, 1901.

leaders, dominated these people by fear and threats and appeals to their religious prejudices, and persuaded very many of them to join their secret societies and assist the insurgents with money and provisions.

"Many persons of influence and means, who were opposed to the rebellion, aided them secretly, being in fear of their lives, which we are powerless to protect on account of the utter insufficiency of the troops in this district.

[*Summary of omitted portions*: Not sufficient troops to protect friendly natives. Capture of guns more important than killing of soldiers. More troops needed.]

Difficulties Greater than in Indian Warfare.

"I have been in Indian campaigns when it took over one hundred soldiers to capture each Indian; but the problem here is more difficult on account of the inbred treachery of these people, their great number, and the impossibility of recognizing the actively bad from those only passively so. If it was deemed advisable to pursue the methods of European nations in arms in suppressing rebellions among Asiatics, the insurrection could have been easily put down a month ago. Even now, although the seeds of rebellion have permeated all classes, such methods would soon put an end to all active insurrection.

Guerrillas recruiting in Almost Every Pueblo.

"Almost every pueblo in this district is the recruiting ground and support of one or more guerrilla bands, who are kept quiet, to a greater or less extent, by the presence of troops. The well-disposed in the towns have not as yet the organization, courage, or means of suppressing these bands. As soon as the troops are withdrawn from a town, these bands become active, and intimidate and murder those opposed to them."

[*Summary of omitted portions*: Need of more troops. People lacking in courage. Troops needed not to fight large numbers, but to protect towns and to scout.]

Withdrawal of Troops Abandons Friendly Natives to Assassination.

This report was forwarded by General Wheaton with the following comment: * —

"12,000 volunteers serving in this Department, will under existing orders, be sent home for discharge within five months. It will be impracticable to replace the eleven battalions of volunteers to be sent from the First District by regular troops now serving in this Department. In the event of the arrival of more regular battalions from the United States, the assignment to the First District of such as, in the opinion of the Division Commander may be available, is recommended. The evacuation of extensive territory now garrisoned in the First District will cause the assassination of many natives suspected to be friendly to the United States or disposed to acquiesce in our occupation. There is apparently no remedy for this state of affairs, which will be the result of employing forces of no permanent tenure of service beyond June 30, 1900."

European Methods with Rebellious Asiatics.

January 17 General Young wrote by request, explaining what he had meant in his previous letter by European methods with rebellious Asiatics.† The Europeans, he says, have frequently—

"1. Given military commanders supreme authority in a rebellious country, with full power to suspend or change all laws, appoint all officers, and have full control of all receipts and expenditure of money.

"2. Exercise of full censorship of the press, and remove from the country any press agent whose presence was deemed harmful.

* Contained in Diary of Events from December 29 to January 12. Received by the War Department March 5, 1901.

† Contained in Diary of Events from January 12 to January 30. Received by the War Department March 18, 1901.

"3. Recognize the fact that Asiatics have no idea of gratitude, honor, or the sanctity of an oath, and in all dealings with them to treat them accordingly.

"4. Recognize the fact that they were fighting a people the mass of whom were worse than ordinary savages, and were not entitled to the benefits of C. O. 100, A. C. O. 1863.

"5. Inspired rebellious Asiatics, individually and collectively, with a greater fear of the reigning government than they had of the rebels.

"6. Retaliated in kind on their rebellious subjects for every murder and assassination of person on account of their being friendly to the reigning government.

"7. Authorized the military commander to punish by death summarily or by means of drum-head court-martial, provost or summary courts, all spies, murderers, assassins, and persons caught with arms after having taken the oath of allegiance.

"8. Deported all persons caught with arms in their hands, all leaders, civil or military, whose presence in the rebellious country was deemed prejudicial to the permanent sovereignty of the reigning power.

"9. Confiscated all real and personal property of every insurgent and their aiders and abettors.

"10. Divided the rebellious country into zones, concentrating the people of each zone into circumscribed places, and placed them under absolute military control.

"11. Laid waste the country used as hiding-places and rendezvous for insurgents, their aiders and abettors.

"12. Appointed only residents of the reigning country to judicial and other high positions in the rebellious country.

"13. Given the preference to honorably discharged soldiers, who were competent, in appointment to all positions.

"14. Made the military commander the judge, that the condition in any part of the country rendered it advisable to establish civil government."

American Public Opinion would not tolerate European Methods.

General Wheaton, in forwarding this report of General Young's, stated* that the method suggested above "would speedily end resistance to the authority of the United States in this archipelago." But he says: "The vagaries of impracticable public sentiment, which considers war as an affair to be waged for sentimental reasons, will prevent the adoption of many of the ways enlightened nations have found to be necessary in dealing with races that have no idea of gratitude, honor, or the sanctity of an oath, and have a contempt for a government which they do not fear. The nearer we approach the methods found necessary by the other nations through centuries of experience in dealing with Asiatics, the less the National Treasury will be expended and the fewer graves will be made."

Turn of the Tide.

The discouraging conditions in Northern Luzon do not, however, appear to have been representative of the situation as a whole. In other parts of the archipelago there were soon signs that the tide had begun to turn. General MacArthur, commenting later upon the results of the more stringent policy, calls especial attention to the December 20 proclamation, saying:† "The exposition of the law of occupied places contained therein was in the nature of a revelation to the entire audience. The white population of the archipelago, especially the part thereof resident in Manila, was, perhaps, quite as much, if not more, surprised at the views propounded, and the penalties prescribed, than

* Diary of Events from January 12 to January 30. Received by War Department March 18, 1901.

† General MacArthur's Report for 1901, page 9. This report came to hand when the greater part of this pamphlet was completed. A few passages are inserted where they are needed to give thoroughness to the statement. The whole report will be treated in a later publication of the Society.

the natives. The Filipino military leaders probably had never before been informed of the existence of such a law, or the possible application thereof to their own actions. As an educational document, the effect was immediate and far-reaching. From the date of its issue secret resistance and apathy began to diminish, and kidnapping and assassination were much abated. In a very short time these malign influences were to a great extent superseded by co-operation and active interest in American affairs. Rarely in war has a single document been so instrumental in influencing ultimate results. The consequences in this instance, however, which lie very near the surface, seem to preclude all possibility of doubt, and also seem to justify the conclusion that the effective pacification of the archipelago commenced December 20, 1900."

III. PEACE MOVEMENT AMONG THE PEOPLE.

1. Earlier Stages of the Peace Movement.

Certain captured insurgent letters, dated as far back as October, 1899, refer to a "drifting toward favoring the American government." For a long time it is plain that these Filipinos, who were promptly dubbed Americanistas by the men in arms, were much in the minority;* and the insurgents seem to have made strenuous efforts to suppress them and their views. The leaders were undoubtedly aided by the fact that, as MacArthur says, the Filipinos were inclined to believe "that in all doubtful matters of politics or war men are never nearer right than when going with their own kith and kin."

Double Dealing toward Americans.

At all events, it soon became evident to our officers that, however much the so-called Americanistas professed to favor American supremacy, they continued secretly to further the insurgent cause. When convicted of double dealing, the Americanistas were wont to assert that their hearts were with the Americans, and that they only served the insurrectos because they feared assassination if they did not do so,—fears in many cases well founded, as captured insurgent papers and official records show.

It seems perfectly evident, however, that in many other cases the plea was simply a subterfuge, inasmuch as Fili-

* In October, 1900, General MacArthur says, "One traitor in each town would effectually destroy the complex insurgent organization"; and General Hughes says, with regard to the island of Panay, "No Judas has been found in the million of people."

pinos, who were in towns strongly garrisoned by American troops, might have cut loose from their associates, had they cared to do so. That General MacArthur believed this to be the case is evident from his December 20 proclamation.

Growing Desire for Peace.

Nevertheless, it is evident that there was among certain Filipinos a genuine and growing feeling that nothing could be gained by prolonging the struggle against American rule, and that the country was in crying need of peace. An illustration of this growing sentiment may be found in the letters * of a certain Inocente Martinez, Presidente Municipal of San Pablo, Laguna Province.

On September 14, 1900, Martinez issued a proclamation to his people, stating that "we have nothing of any sort to gain by means of war or arms," for the insurrectos "cannot fight against the Americans." The letter advised them, therefore, not to support the guerrillas in the vicinity, and concluded,—

"Provided that you follow and obey this, my counsel, I believe that we shall not be injured, but remain in peace."

A Murderous Order.

The next day Dionicio Ticzon, one of the majors of the so-called "Death Column" operating in the vicinity of San Pablo, issued the following order:—

"I give notice under the strictest accountability that, having seen the circular order of the Presidente Señor Martinez of the 14th inst., I warn you that he who complies with the advice in the said order, and he who reports the passing or presence within his district of the soldiers, will be shot without excuse or pretext, especially the chiefs of barrios; and also all the houses will be burned. There-

* Contained in the Diary of Events from November 1 to November 14. Received by War Department December 17, 1900.

fore, you may understand that if, by reason of notice not having been given us, the American soldiers are able to arrive at the point where we are, the chiefs of the immediate barrio will also be shot without fail."

Filipino Protest against Terrorizing.

President Martinez replied to Major Ticzon's order in part, as follows:—

"The Americans are here solely for the purpose of protecting and defending us from attack and injury by those who are evil disposed, and in order that we may become enlightened, as are they and other nations; in order that we may become wise, rich, and happy, for we are notoriously indifferent to all our deficiencies. Consider it well, that you may recognize the most exact and true argument; for, according to my poor opinion, I am not mistaken.

"Why is it that those who are termed *insurrectos*, such as Mr. Dionicio Ticzon and his followers, do not wish to meet the Americans whom, they say, are their enemies, and that he who gives information as to where the *insurrectos* may be found must be shot, and the houses of his neighbors burned? These can hardly be called defenders of the country.

[*Summary of omitted portion*: They cannot conquer the enemy if they are unwilling to fight him, but merely put to flight and kill peaceful Filipinos.]

"How will they be able to gain what they call 'independence' if they can do no more than kill, and kill only Filipinos? I believe it is very far off, very far off.

[*Summary of omitted portions*: Ticzon's men do not desire common welfare. Ticzon not worthy of respect.]

"For my part, I have no hatred toward those who have turned *insurrectos* or defenders of the country, if they so wish, and that is their true intention; but, furthermore, they should not molest the peaceable inhabitants who do not

wish to fight and who are their countrymen. They should only trouble those whom they call their enemies, their countrymen remaining in peace, for which reason all would be able to acknowledge them the defenders of the country.

"I have said that each one has his choice; and why must any one be forced or obliged against his will? That is not what is called *natural right*. They do not know the meaning of the word 'liberty.' We desire liberty that we may have freedom, and that the choice of each may be left free with regard only to rights. What is it they desire? As I understand it, they desire liberty.

"Why do they who say they are suffering all these penalties that they may secure liberty act thus? Ah! they are greatly mistaken. I am very sure the significance of the word 'liberty' is not known to them; for no one can be compelled against his will, and therefore I believe that Dionicio Ticzon would have been unable to say what he did in his letter, had he understood the meaning of the word 'liberty.' "

Loyal to Ties of Race and Blood.

One difficulty which stood in the way of the Americanistas was a certain feeling of loyalty to their brothers in arms, which, whether due to "consanguineous homogeneity" or to some other psychological state, made the majority of them unwilling to obtain peace by betraying their comrades to the American troops. This feeling is illustrated by the following incident, which occurred in October, 1900.

The Presidente of San Miguel, José Buencamino, brought to General MacArthur, in Manila, the following statement, dated October 27, 1900:—

"The undersigned Presidente of San Miguel de Mayumo, province of Bulacan, has come here with leave to personally inform your Excellency to the following points:—

[*Summary of omitted portions*: Village of San Miguel has 18,000 residents. The insurgent Colonel Tecson is in the mountains near by, with 500 or 800 rifles and good supply of bolos and cartridges. During the day Tecson's men remain in the village as peaceful residents, but at night sally forth as guerrillas, "open fire upon the defenceless residents, respecting neither old people, women, nor children." The peaceful residents object because of the loss occasioned by these raids, and also because they "have the effect of making the Americans regard the residents as accomplices. The American soldiers, therefore, fire upon the residents and their houses, as happened on the night of the 13th of the present month, when women and children were killed, and 219 houses were burned by the Americans, causing a loss of about \$60,000."]

"For the garrison and protection of such an extensive territory, wherein there are more than 4,000 insurgents, there are only 300 American soldiers, who rest neither day nor night in fighting and pursuing the enemy, especially the Provost Marshal, Lieutenant Godson, whose bravery, activity, and intelligence are feared by Colonel Tecson, who has offered 300 pesos to any one who shall kill him; but no one is willing to kill him, as he is beloved by all.

Residents of San Miguel favor American Rule.

"Therefore, this small force can never terminate the insurrection at San Miguel, nor protect in a proper manner the entire jurisdiction of the village; they can but restrict themselves to defending and preserving order in the main part, against which Tecson directs his attacks, because the residents are unwilling to contribute to his guerrillas, and prefer order and the American government.

"This reaction has been brought about by me since I was elected Presidente and in compliance with my oath of fidelity; and it is now the reason of Tecson's attacks on the village, and of the threats he has made against my life and property,—a reason which I submit for your consideration, along with the hope that you will pardon my reference to it.

"I would inform you that the majority of the people are

loyal to the United States, the vengeance and threats above cited being a proof of that statement. But it is nevertheless true that the barrios and residents of the same are controlled by Tecson, they being obliged to obey out of fear of assassination, and being defenceless on account of the distance from the American forces, already more than ten persons having been assassinated by Tecson. Finally, as long as Tecson and his forces draw their sustenance from the barrios, the insurrection will not end."

Will not betray their Fellow-townsmen.

In forwarding this statement to Washington, General MacArthur says:—

"In this instance another phase of Filipino character is disclosed. The Presidente, it will be noted from his memorial, was profoundly impressed with the danger which menaced his town and himself personally; but, notwithstanding this fact, he was unwilling to impart most important information, a knowledge of which would have enabled our troops to protect him and his town.

"He knew or could readily have ascertained when and where the insurgents concealed in the barrios could have been surprised and captured, and also who the insurgent sympathizers were, actively employed in the town itself in collecting and forwarding supplies, recruits, military information to the troops in the field. None of this specific information could be obtained from him; and this characteristic reluctance of everybody, even among the most active pro-Americans, to give information of any military value, is one of the greatest difficulties in the existing situation.

"In this instance Señor Buencamino himself was a victim of this mistaken policy of screening his neighbors from the consequences of their own indiscretions, as, on his return from Manila to San Miguel, he was waylaid by an insurrecto force, and himself and escort of eight United States soldiers were all killed or captured."

Obstacles in the Way of Peace.

The greatest difficulty, until after the election at least, was that peacefully inclined natives could not hit upon terms of peace acceptable both to the Filipinos and the American government,—the terms of the former being, at the most, independence, and, at the least, a protectorate, while the terms of the latter were unconditional surrender. During the summer of 1900 there had been an attempt,* headed by Pedro Paterno and Buencamino, to bring the Americans and Filipinos together; and, as one means to that end, a public fiesta had been planned, as a token of gratitude for the amnesty proclamation.

As a consequence of this effort, General MacArthur tells us, "Don Pedro Paterno, when fully committed to the undertaking, found that he was condemned to the impossible task of making the celebration appear as a spontaneous offering of the people to amnesty, and at the same time to satisfy the Filipino leaders that the ultimate result thereof would be independence with an American protectorate."

The small number of people who were willing at that time to accept American sovereignty unreservedly is illustrated by the fact that, in spite of its clemency, only 5,022 persons took advantage of the terms of amnesty. And many of the 5,022, the records show, took the oath of allegiance which accompanied the amnesty without any intention of keeping it.

2. Effect of the Presidential Election.

When it became known, however, that the policy of retaining the Philippines had been sustained in the Presidential election, the number of people who felt that the

*This incident is told at length in the previous pamphlet, entitled "A Period of Guerrilla Warfare."

time for peace had come, seems to have daily increased. While they were not ready for peace at any cost, yet they seem to have begun to cast about for some honorable means of ridding their country of the "curse of war" which at that time had devastated their land for more than four years.

Leading Citizens of Iloilo take Action.

The argument of these men is best set forth in the following letter* to the insurgent General Delgado, drawn up by certain prominent citizens of Iloilo, island of Panay, early in December, 1900:—

"In the Filipino-American conflict three factors had to be considered—the Treaty of Paris, American Congress, and the resistance of the Filipinos.

"A. Although we would like to discuss the validity of the Treaty of Paris, it is an accomplished fact before the nations, which have sanctioned it by their passivity, or rather by their indifference to the American and Filipino blood shed in the last two years in a conflict born from the Treaty.

"B. Once the Treaty admitted, we find therein Article 9, paragraph 2, which says:—

"'The civil rights and political condition of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States shall be decided by Congress.'

"And the re-election of McKinley, with a majority of 111 votes, shows clearly that Congress will approve his politics.

"C. Congress having approved McKinley's politics, we have only now to consider the resistance of the Filipinos. Is it useful to make that resistance? Is it better to offer resistance or to cease it? To answer these problems, we will offer the following consideration: The only reasons for

* The whole matter is contained in the Diary of Events from November 30 to December 14, received by the War Department January 12, 1901.

promoting resistance are: to excite the interference of other nations in favor of the cause: to vanquish the army of the United States; to tire out the people of the United States until they decide to abandon the islands.

"A. We can consider the first point as resolved. The other nations will not interfere here when they have not done so in the Transvaal and Orange Free State, and are all more or less preparing themselves for events of greater interest to them.

"B. Without taking it as a humiliation for us, we may confess that we cannot vanquish the army of the United States, especially so when Congress will have determined to put an end to the war and authorize the government to make the necessary sacrifices.

"C. Can we hope that by keeping up guerrilla warfare, and by continually worrying Americans, they will get tired and abandon the islands? Once the termination of the war voted by Congress, it becomes a matter of national honor, and it would be difficult for the American nation to get tired in such conditions; and, if they have not felt tired for two years, it is difficult to see how they could become tired after four. On the other part, for us the situation will become every day more critical. Our war resources will diminish as the time passes, and with small hopes of renewing them from the exterior. Food will be getting scarcer, as the work in the fields will cease, as a necessary consequence of irreconcilable ideas, fear of reprisals, and lack of cattle. And, since war of resistance has no object and no reason to be, once the termination of the war voted by Congress, is it not better to escape in time from the weight of the law of the victor and make the most of the situation? The longer the war, the greater the sacrifices for America and for us also, and the greater, of course, the compensation expected by the victor from the vanquished, after his final triumph. Why then, continue the resistance? A transac-

tion would give us to-day benefits that would certainly not be granted later, after greater expense and sacrifices of life on the part of North America, as for all such sacrifices a just, if not an exorbitant, compensation, will be required. Since there can be no favorable issue of the war, and that it can only serve to make the transaction more humiliating later, what is the use of keeping it up? And above all, after being defeated, we will have to associate with the American people, is it not reasonable to accept said association to-day, in better condition, and not later on, when, in consequence of the sacrifices made, the conditions will be harder? And lastly, since the above-mentioned association is about to take place, is it not better for us to shorten the distance and the abysses placed each day by the war between the Americans and ourselves? And let us not forget the victims which would be caused hereafter by the useless resistance.

“(Signed) ADRIAN HERNANDEZ, *late insurgent General*.

“(Signed) CORNELIO MELIZA, *prominent citizen, father of Judge Meliza*.

“(Signed) PABLO ARANETA, *late insurgent General*.

“(Signed) VICTORINO MAPA, *ex-Attorney-general of the civil government in Panay*.

“(Signed) FRANCISCO SERIANO, *ex-Secretary of council of same*.

“(Signed) JOCITE YUSA, *prominent lawyer, ex-insurgent*.

“(Signed) RAMON AVANCENA, *Angel Corteza, former insurgent General*.”

The letter, when forwarded to Washington, was accompanied by the following statement:—

“The signatory parties to the following letter are the most prominent leaders of the Nationalist movement in Panay. Heretofore they have been considered irreconcilable, and as secretly encouraging the insurrection. Their

present attitude, therefore, is most important, even if not entirely sincere, as the fact of their present action may be to start a pro-American movement, which may get beyond their control."

Secret Service Notes on the Signers.

The memorandum accompanying this letter describes the signers, as follows:—

"The Hernandez family, while a prominent one (three officers formerly among the insurgents, I think, and one running an insurgent newspaper), did not stand out as prominent as the next three. Their home was in Jaro. They are intermarried with prominent families.

"Cornelio Meliza is thought about the most prominent and most influential man in the Visayans. His word is almost law. He is a man of great ability and tact, and would so appear in any community.

"Pablo Araneta, Visayan, and former commander-in-chief of the Panay insurgents, though never prominent after American occupation of Iloilo. The Araneta family is large and influential.

"Victorino Mapa. I think he was chief justice rather than attorney-general. He is considered by all European residents the ablest lawyer in the Visayans, and probably, after Meliza, the most influential man. There can be no doubt that the two men, Meliza and Mapa, have been insurgent sympathizers; and it has been generally considered that they were the real head of the insurgent government in Panay. Mapa ill-concealed his sympathies, while Meliza had the apparent sincerity of a true friend.

"The other four I do not know much about. Yusay is much spoken of, but I do not think he has a very great influence."

A second memorandum describes the same men in a little different way:—

"Adrian Hernandez, brigadier-general of the insurgent forces in Panay, and next in rank to Delgado. Intelligent man, with nice family. He was the brains of the Panay insurrection after Araneta quit. He left on account of failure of health through dysentery. His brother, Julio Hernandez, for a time a high administrative official and a bright fellow, at present runs a newspaper in Iloilo. Julio's influence has been for peace.

"Cornelio Meliza, age about seventy, owns city houses, wharfs, stores, ships, and plantations, is the most influential man in Panay, and the most slippery. No scrap of incriminating paper has ever been discovered against him. What he says goes in Panay.

"Pablo Araneta, former commander-in-chief, age about thirty-five. He is a surgeon of Molo, influential, frank, and straightforward for a Filipino.

"Victorino Mapa, considered the best lawyer in Panay, has much influence.

"Francisco Seriano, age about forty, is connected with the influential people, acting as agent. Not reliable.

"Jovito Yusay, young, with some money. Does not amount to much."

3. The Federal Party organizes.

It will be remembered that General MacArthur, in his December 25 cable, said:—

"Pro-American natives, Manila, with chief justice at the head, have organized party which apparently has some elements of cohesion and usefulness."

The organization referred to was the "Federal Party," which has since amply justified General MacArthur's prophecy concerning it.

Intelligent Filipinos take the Lead.

The Associated Press letter of December 17 contains the following comment : *—

“The first political party under the American régime is in process of formation. Its principles have been embodied in a platform which will shortly be made public. It is understood that the declarations of the platform give the fullest recognition to American sovereignty, and also favor a considerable degree of native autonomy concerning internal and local affairs.

“Several of the most intelligent Filipino leaders, who have been instrumental in bringing the matter to a head, have been in conference with those interested; and this evening the platform will be outlined to the Philippine Commission by Señor Buencamino, former Premier, in the so-called government of Aguinaldo, Colonel Aquiles, and Dr. Frank F. Bourns, an American, formerly chief surgeon, with the rank of major, and health officer of Manila. Dr. Bourns was with Professor Dean C. Worcester prior to the American occupation, and has confidential relations with the Filipino leaders.”

Manifesto of Federal Party.[†]

On Sunday, December 23, 1900, the Federal party promulgated its platform with the following prefatory manifesto, which was published in the Manila papers the following day :—

* The Manila *American* of January 8, 1901, gives the substance of a speech by Buencamino at the Royal Theatre, urging the people to cease opposing the American government, and to band together for peace. They would soon be joined, Buencamino claimed, by the Filipinos in arms, the “lawless element eliminated, and in every home in the islands peace and security would reign.”

“No Rest Given the Weary Rebels,” is the head-line of the article which follows. On January 9 the head-lines ran : “Southern Natives join the Federal Party. Big Share Went for Peace.” The next day, January 10, one reads, “Take the Oath, or go to Guam.”

† On file in the Insular Department of the War Department.

"The Philippine people are more interested than any one else in their happiness; and the people, we say, should take the most appropriate means in order that, with the coming of peace, they can freely organize a new constitution for our country, foster its manufactures, its agriculture, and its commerce, in order that they may enter upon the true era of liberty and prosperity which they would certainly soon reach.

"For that we have wished to make this common effort with the idea of peace. We are not forming a party in the egotistical sense that political groups have. We wish the reunion of all Filipinos who truly desire peace and are disposed to work toward that end.

"Our aspirations appear clearly and practically enunciated in our platform. To sustain them, there will join us those Filipinos who desire to do so, convinced that we are seeking only our happiness, securing for our country the largest measure of liberty, and for the future the absolute application of the American Constitution, with all the rights possessed by every citizen of the great Republic.

"So we call ourselves the Federal Party, because that under American sovereignty the highest and unanimous aspirations of the Philippines will be to become a part of its (United States) federation, constituting a free and sovereign State in the form now enjoyed by the States of the Union.

"Consistent to the principles that guide us, we call, not to any special class, but to all our brothers, to all Philippines. We stretch forth our arms, in order that united we can victoriously say that peace has come on a solid basis."

Platform of the Federal Party.*

In the platform proper "the party declares that it accepts and supports itself upon the declarations made to the

* On file in the Insular Department of the War Department.

Philippine people by the Commission presided over by Mr. Schurman and by the Commission at present presided over by the Honorable William Taft."

Platform for Preliminary Period.

There are two forms of government outlined in the platform. The first, entitled "Preliminary Period," provides for "recognition of the sovereignty of the United States, which will be represented in these islands by a liberal democratic and representative government," and for "individual rights, liberties, and guarantees of person, property, and domicile, with freedom of worship, and complete separation of Church and State."

It states that all persons who join this society must agree to work for the "pacification of the country, and to secure recognition of its [United States] sovereignty by Filipinos now in arms, since their resistance is bringing this country to ruin and destruction and leads to the commission of a multitude of crimes that discredit the Philippine people in the eyes of civilized nations."

It provides also for "municipal or self-government,—government substantially like that of the United States, and a provincial or department government, subject only to the high inspection of the central government"; for "creation of an armed militia for the preservation of order and the protection of persons and property against criminals."

It states that primary elementary education shall be free, and that an effort will be made to require all children of both sexes to attend either public or private schools; that higher instruction shall be encouraged by the legislative bodies; and that public employment will be given on the basis of aptitude, "according to the Civil Service laws now in force."

Platform for Constitutional Period.

The second form of government for the "Constitutional Period" provides that:—

"1. The Philippine people will have five representatives to the Congress and the government of the Union, who will remain in Washington. It will be one of the objects of this party to obtain from the Congress of the United States a law favorable to this object.

"2. A House of Representatives, elected by suffrage, in the same manner as councillors and alcaldes, in number proportional to the qualified electors of each department or province.

"3. A Senate, composed of individuals, one-half elected in senatorial districts by the alcaldes of the town, conformably to the law, and the other half named by the governor-general. The chamber of this Senate will form the territorial congress.

"4. A governor-general, named by the honorable President of the United States; department governors, named by the governor-general, subject to approval by the government at Washington; and provincial governors, likewise named by the governor-general, with the advice and consent of the Senate. The governor-general will have secretaries, the number to be fixed by law."

The governor-general shall have the right of veto, the platform states, under the conditions and restrictions contained in the United States Constitution for the executive veto. Taxation bills shall originate in the House. The judiciary shall be appointed by the President of the United States, and justices of the peace shall be appointed by the president of the Supreme Court on propositions from the municipalities. "Nevertheless, it will be an aspiration of the party that the organization of the judiciary shall be governed by the principle of the immovability and independence of its functionaries." And rights shall be recog-

nized "in accordance with justice and the laws in force at the date of the passage of the act which created the right, in accordance with the precedence adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States in similar cases which have occurred since the war of the secession."

Further, "the territory of the Philippine Islands may be considered as one of the States of the Union, but it can never be ceded in whole or in part by the United States to any foreign power." The platform concludes with the statement that "the foregoing fundamental principles constitute in a concrete form the aspirations of this party, which hopes, at the same time, that the amendments and objections which may be made by the government of the United States will be of the most liberal and democratic nature."

Board of Directors.

On the day that the platform was promulgated the following board of managers (later called board of directors, with Dr. Bourns as president) was chosen: Mr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera, Mr. Cayetano S. Arellano, Mr. Frank S. Bourns, Mr. Florentino Torres, Mr. José Ner, Mr. Thomas G. del Rosario.

Cable to President of the United States.

On the same day the party sent the following cable to the President of the United States:—

"Federal Party organized for the purpose of securing peace under American sovereignty salutes the first magistrate and offers its adhesion, requesting that these desires be transmitted to Congress."

4. The Federal Party bears Fruit.

The question naturally arises,—what was the attitude of the American authorities toward an organization with

such aims as the Federal Party publicly avowed? On this point General MacArthur says, "For the time being all the prescriptions of the party platforms are in abeyance, excepting only the plank which dedicates the movement to pacification." *

In a short time it became evident that the party was to be a very vital factor in the pacification of the country.

On January 9, 1901, Judge Taft cabled: † "Federal Party for peace; direct result of election. Well organized, and rapidly increasing in Manila. Preparing to extend organization to many provinces on pressing and numerous invitations from leading citizens. . . . Party is composed of best men in islands. Main object, peace and civil government under sovereignty of the United States."

During January and February the president and board of directors of the party accompanied the Taft Commission in its travels; and it was customary, when the Commission visited a pueblo, for the Federal Party leaders to call a meeting, which, the records show, was attended in the majority of cases by a large number of influential citizens. A local group of the Federal Party would then be formed, which would work for the pacification of the pueblo. The following despatches, selected out of a large number on record at the War Department, illustrate some of the methods and successes of the party.

Methods of Federal Party.

"A branch of the Federal Party was organized yesterday at Balanga. The leading men of the city, in point of wealth, were present at first meeting. The organization will be extended throughout the entire province. The best citizens are most interested in the party."

"Federal Party of entire province, including Presidentes

* General MacArthur's Report for 1901, page 17.

† On file at the War Department.

of each pueblo in province, had a harmonious meeting to-day, and, as a body, resolved to send notices to all insurgent leaders in the province that the insurrection, at least as regards this province, must cease at once, and that, if the armed bodies do not surrender within a stated time, six or seven days, that they, the party and Presidentes, would request permission to have their local police armed, and that they would then accompany the American troops in incessant effort to capture or kill all armed or inimicable parties."

"A strong branch of the Federal Party has been organized in this and adjacent towns. A manifesto has been prepared, signed by the principal men of the ten pueblos, which I have given them permission to send to Lacuna and Sandico. This manifesto very strong, and tells those leaders that it is the desire of the people that resistance to American authority cease at once, and that, unless they surrender with their arms or leave the country, they, the signers of the manifesto, will actively aid the Americans in hunting them down. Also states that they think best no more contributions of food or money. Also calls attention to the reforms and liberal local self-government inaugurated by the Americans. Among leaders in this movement are a number of ex-insurgent officers; including Padilla and Natividad. Conditions here were never better than at present. Mass of people very friendly; rifles being presented or captured every day. Sandico and Lacuna are in the mountains, each with very few men. They are doing nothing but keeping out of the way of troops and awaiting developments."

The above reports are from General Wheaton's Department (Northern Luzon), so recently in a state of extreme disaffection, and are illustrative of reports from other parts of the islands.

In reviewing the situation as a whole, it becomes evident

that the extraordinary rapidity with which this movement spread was due to a coincidence of events, prominent among which was the December 20 proclamation, whereby it was brought home to the natives that the Americans were in the Philippines to stay, and that those who adhered to America's cause would be protected.

5. Earlier and Later Peace Movements Contrasted.

It will be remembered that the peace movement initiated in June, 1900, aimed at independence under a protectorate, although, "as a sop to American pride," it suggested that their country be called "Free Philippine State" instead of Philippine Republic, as in the days of insurgent rule. In spite of the fact that the principles of this peace movement embodied to a large extent the national aspirations of the Filipinos, as previously expressed, it received little support from the people,—largely, no doubt, because the majority felt that, with the American election pending, it was the time for fighting, and not for attempts at negotiation.

After the election, however, the situation had materially altered. The war faction had played its strongest card, and lost. The country was in desperate need of peace, and apparently all hope of concessions from America had vanished. The question then was,—not what did they want, but what could they hope to get. Accordingly, when the peace movement reappeared in December, 1900, it was upon a less ambitious basis.* Calling itself the Federal Party, it

* Not many weeks after the launching of the Federal party, another peace movement appeared under the name of the Partido Conservador. This party recommended the acceptance of United States sovereignty as a temporary expedient, expressing the hope that independence would be ultimately granted. The *Manila American* for February 26, 1901, describes this movement under a head-line: "Will be composed of Loyal Filipinos, who have never entered

explicitly accepted American sovereignty. But, in shifting its ground, it advanced the new aspiration that the Philipines be admitted as a part of the United States federation, "constituting a free and sovereign State in the form now enjoyed by the States of the Union," and under "the absolute application of the Constitution, with all the rights possessed by the citizens of the great Republic."

This platform, which, as has been shown, secured the immediate support of a large number of influential Filipinos, should be distinctly borne in mind, in following the important part played by the Federal Party in the pacification of the country.

Politics. Will wait for Independence and aim to establish Peace and develop the Islands."

The article says in part: "The object of the new party is to prove that there are Filipinos who are capable of self-government, and, if the United States saw fit to give them their independence, they would gladly accept it. But, if it would be deemed unwise to grant the Filipino people this, they would devote their time to the upbuilding of the resources of the islands. The name of the party, Partido Conservador, was suggested by Judge Taft, when the objects of the new party were explained.

"Nothing is known of the platform of the new party other than that the question of religion will not be allowed to enter. Its sole object at present is the establishment of peace, and has no conditions attached. The character of the men who constitute the leaders of the Partido Conservador is sufficient proof of the genuineness of the alleged claim."

This movement seems to have received no encouragement from our government authorities, and did not play a sufficiently important part to secure mention in any current official report.

BEGINNINGS OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

1. Early Steps toward Establishing Civil Rule.

The report of the Schurman Commission states,* "It is an axiom with all Filipinos—an axiom learned of bitter experience, and not merely derived from the political wisdom of mankind—that there is no genuine freedom where the military power is not subordinated to the civil."

Accordingly, the Schurman Commission in January, 1900, urged the establishment of civil government at the earliest possible date, saying that such a step "would do more than any other single occurrence to reconcile the Filipinos to American sovereignty, which would then stand revealed, not merely as irresistible power, but as an instrument for the preservation and development of the rights and liberties of the Filipinos and the promotion of their happiness and prosperity. To secure the confidence and affection of the Filipinos, it is necessary not only to study their interests, but to consult their wishes, to sympathize with their ideals and prejudices even, and (so far as the public safety permits) to let them, in all local affairs, govern themselves in their own way."†

Recognizing the importance of this recommendation, the United States authorities desired to establish civil government as early as practicable in such municipalities as could reasonably be considered pacified. "For the accomplishment of this end," says Secretary Root,‡ "the Chief Justice Arelano and Attorney-general Torres, assisted by three American judicial officers, were constituted a board on the 29th of January, 1900."

* Report of the Schurman Commission, vol. i., page 90.

† *Ibid.*

‡ Report for 1900, page 23.

The following month the President of the United States appointed the Taft Commission "to aid the existing authorities" in inaugurating "governments essentially popular in their form as fast as territory is held in control by our troops." *

In March, 1900, the Adjutant General telegraphed General Otis † to inquire "what action has been taken by Arellano Board," the information "being needed to instruct the Philippine Commission leaving for Manila, April 15." General Otis replied † "that the board has reported a form of municipal government, and orders are about to be issued, publishing same as it is considered practicable, liberal, and conservative, containing many features from the 'Maura' law." ‡

The Taft Commission, as has been said, arrived in the Philippines June 3, 1900, and, after spending the summer in familiarizing themselves with conditions in the islands, entered upon their legislative duties September 1, 1900. The sessions of the Commission were from the first open, "and its discussions and the proposed measures upon what it is deliberating are public, while it takes testimony and receives suggestions from citizens as if it were a legislative committee." §

From September to January the Commission was chiefly engaged in making appropriations for railroads, schools, etc., drafting a civil and judicial procedure bill, in considering a tariff for the islands, || and in remodelling the existing form of civil government for pacified districts.

* Instructions of the President to the Taft Commission, given on page 72 of the Report of the Secretary of War for 1900.

† On file at War Department.

‡ Señor Maura, who was Spanish minister of the colonies, drafted a form of municipal law for the Philippines, which was passed by the Cortez in 1892.

§ Report of Secretary of War for 1900, page 25.

|| "Before the first of September," says the Secretary of War, in his report for 1900, page 26, "a board of officers had been engaged upon the revision of the tariff for the islands in the light of such criticisms and suggestions as had

2. The Commission Recommends Action by Congress.

Jan. 2, 1901, the Commission sent the following cable to Washington: *

"ROOT, *Secretary of War, Washington:*

"If you approve, ask transmission to proper Senators and Representatives of following: Passage of Spooner bill at present session greatly needed to secure best result from improving conditions. Until its passage no purely central civil government can be established, no public franchises of any kind granted, and no substantial investment of private capital in internal improvements possible. All are needed as most important step in complete pacification. Strong peace party organized with defined purpose of securing civil government under United States, and reasonably expect civil government and relief for inevitable but annoying restraints of military rule long before subject can be taken up by new Congress. Time near at hand, in our opinion, when disturbances existing can better be suppressed by native police of a civil government, with army as auxiliary force, than by continuance of complete military control. Power to make change should be put in hands of President to act promptly when time arrives to give Filipino people an object-lesson in advantages of peace. Quasi civil government under way. Power most restricted and unsatisfying. Commission embarrassed in securing good material for judicial and other service by necessarily provisional character of military government and uncertainty of tenure.

been made regarding the old tariff. The Commission has considered the report of this Board, and, after full public hearings of business interests in the islands, has formulated a tariff law which has been transmitted to the Department. This has been given to the press and published in the trade journals in this country, and suggestions thereon from the business interests of the United States have been publicly invited by the Department."

* Report of the Taft Philippine Commission, page 5.

"Sale of public lands and allowance of mining claims impossible until Spooner bill. Hundreds of American miners on ground awaiting law to perfect claims. More coming. Good element in pacification. Urgently recommend amendment Spooner bill, so that its operation be not postponed until complete suppression of all insurrection, but only until in President's judgment, civil government may be safely established. Conditions rapidly improving to point where civil government, with aid of army, will be more efficient to secure peace than military control.

"COMMISSION."

3. The Spooner Bill.

The Spooner bill above referred to had been at that time before the Senate for over a year. The bill provided that, when all insurrection against the United States authority should be suppressed, and until otherwise ordered by Congress, all military, civil, and judicial power necessary to govern the Philippines should "be vested in such persons or person and exercised in such manner as the President of the United States shall direct for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion."

During the spring of 1900 this measure was debated at length in the Senate. The ground taken by its advocates is indicated by the following extract : * —

"The President, under the military power, which still controls and must for some time control the islands, could do all that this bill provides. But it is well that he should have the direct authorization of Congress, and be enabled to meet any emergency that may arise with the sanction of the law-making power, until that power shall decree otherwise. Above all, it

* Speech of Hon. Henry Cabot Lodge in the Senate, March 7, 1900, page 3.

is important that Congress should assert its authority ; that we should not leave the executive acting with the unlimited authority of the war power to go alone after the conclusion of peace, but that he should proceed under the authority of Congress in whatever he does until Congress shall otherwise more specifically provide. By this bill we follow the well-settled American precedents of Jefferson and Monroe, which were used still later in the case of Hawaii. To leave the war power unrestrained after the end of the war, as was done in the case of California and New Mexico, is to abdicate our own authority. This bill is the assertion of Congressional authority and of the legislative power of the government. To undertake any further or more far-reaching legislation at this time would be, in my judgment, a great mistake. But I still believe it to be of great importance to define our position, so that it may be perfectly understood by the inhabitants of the Philippines, as well as by our own people."

The bill failed to come to a vote that spring, and stood as first business on the calendar when Congress reassembled in December, 1900. The Subsidy Bill was then given precedence, it being understood that no Philippine legislation would be attempted during the short session.

The recommendation of the Taft Commission, however, gave a new aspect to the situation. The cable, as given above, was printed (together with other reports from the Commission), in a report of the Secretary of War, and transmitted to the President January 24, 1901, accompanied by the statement* that the Secretary wished "to call attention to some conditions existing in the Philippine Islands, which indicate that the development of that country along the lines of peaceful industrial progress now requires the exercise of powers of civil government not vested in this Department, or in you as military commander, but requiring a grant of authority from the Congress."

* Report of the Taft Philippine Commission.

The President recommends Legislation.

January 25 the President sent the Secretary's report to Congress with the following message: * —

"To the Senate and House of Representatives :

"For the information of the Congress, and with a view to such action on its part as it may deem wise and appropriate, I transmit a report of the Secretary of War, made to me under date of January 24, 1901, containing the report of the Taft Commission, its several acts of legislation, and other important information relating to the conditions and immediate wants of the Philippine Islands.

"I earnestly recommend legislation under which the government of the islands may have authority to assist in their peaceful industrial development in the directions indicated by the Secretary of War.

"WILLIAM MCKINLEY."

January 28 the following cable † from the Directory of the Federal Party was read in the Senate: —

"MANILA, January 27, 1901.

"President of Senate and Speaker of House,

"Washington :

"Accessions to Federal Party by thousands in all parts of archipelago. Attitude of hitherto irreconcilable press and general public opinion show that labors of party to bring peace will soon be crowned with success. Until now political parties have attempted formation on plans more or less questioning American sovereignty. Our platform makes main plank sovereignty United States, with liberty to each citizen to pursue peacefully his political ideals; hour of peace has sounded for. On our platform are grouped many Filipinos of hitherto irreconcilable ideas; but some, more ob-

* Report of the Taft Philippine Commission, page 3.

† Senate Document 119, Fifty-sixth Congress, Second Session.

stinate, decline to join, for, though willing to accept sovereignty of United States, prospect of indefinite continuance of military government makes them distrust purposes of the United States, and delays their submission.

"Adjournment of present Congress without giving President authority to establish purely civil government with usual powers, and postponement for at least a year of such government, until new Congress, will certainly confirm this distrust. Directory Federal Party believes conferring such authority on President would inspire confidence, hasten acceptance sovereignty of Union and coming of peace. Directory therefore prays both Houses of Congress to authorize President McKinley to establish civil government whenever he believes it opportune." *

The Tactics of Opposing Parties.

Notwithstanding the urgency of these recommendations, no immediate action was taken upon the matter. The bill for the Increased Efficiency of the Military was then before the Senate, and the exigency of the occasion required emphasis upon the military rather than the civil necessities of the Philippines. The Increased Efficiency Bill passed the Senate on January 31.

On February 8, Senator Spooner submitted the substance of his previous bill in the shape of a rider to the Army Appropriation Bill,† which had been introduced by the Committee on Military Affairs four days earlier.‡ This amendment was referred to the Committee on the Philippines,§ which reported it back with an amendment on February 11. It was then referred to the Military Committee, to which the Army Appropriation Bill was also referred February 13.¶ The Army Appropriation Bill, with its amendments, was

* Signed by the Directory of the Federal Party.

† Congressional Record for Fifty-sixth Congress, Second Session, page 2346.

‡ *Ibid.*, page 2113.

§ *Ibid.*, page 2346.

¶ *Ibid.*, page 2608.

reported back to the Senate February 20.* Being an appropriation bill, it must pass before March 4, or a special session of Congress must be convened.

The Spooner amendment came up for discussion in the Senate February 25.† As has been seen, legislation similar to this amendment had been urged the month before by the President, the Secretary of War, and the Taft Commission, as necessary for the industrial development of the islands. Accordingly, in discussing the amendment, the opposition at once took the ground that it was merely a device for assisting American capital.‡

* Congressional Record for Fifty-sixth Congress, Second Session, page 2962.

† *Ibid.*, page 3251.

‡ On this point Senator Teller argued: "If you want to establish a civil government in the Philippine Islands, the power exists in the President of the United States to establish a civil government. Every principle of a civil government, every constitutional provision made, every tradition of a free people, can be enforced by virtue of the President's power if he sees fit to do it. If he desires to give to the people of the Philippine Islands the protection of all the provisions of the Constitution, he can do that.

"Why is it that in the expiring hours of this Congress this provision, so strange to American law and so strange to American minds, so at variance with our ideas of just government, shall be forced upon us? We understand, Mr. President, that we are impotent to defeat this measure, unless we shall debate it to an extent that shall prevent a vote; and, as I have said before, I do not believe we shall accomplish anything by that course."

The argument further ran:—

"Mr. HOAR. . . . So I suppose that one of the chief purposes of this is that the public lands in the Philippine Islands may be sold before the people of the islands have any chance whatever to have a voice in their sale.

"Mr. CAFFERY. Precisely. If the Philippine people ever come in possession of their own, they will discover that they have no public lands or any public franchises. They will all have been alienated. . . .

"Mr. HOAR. This is the method by which we are asked to preach the Philippine Islanders the principles of liberty and civil government, which one eminent advocate of this policy in the Senate declared was going to be so perfect that undoubtedly, when we contemplated that model, we should act upon it here at home, and pattern our own domestic arrangements accordingly.

"Mr. CAFFERY. Mr. President, the method of pacification that is proposed by the Taft Commission reminds me somewhat of the method that a celebrated schoolmaster observed in teaching his school-boys. He starved them to death,

With a view to safeguarding Filipino interests, Senator Hoar on February 25 * introduced an amendment to the Spooner amendment, providing "that no sale or lease of public property shall be made and no franchise granted which is not approved by the President of the United States and is not, in his judgment, clearly necessary for the immediate government of the islands and indispensable for the interests of the people thereof, and which cannot, without great public mischief, be postponed until the establishment of permanent civil government."

This amendment was accepted by the Philippine Committee,† and was embodied in the Spooner amendment,‡ which came to a vote and passed the Senate February 27,§ as a part of the Army Appropriation Bill in the following form:||—

The Army Appropriation Rider.

"All military, civil, and judicial power necessary to govern the Philippine Islands acquired from Spain by the treaties concluded at Paris on the tenth day of December,

did the learned Squeers, in order to pacify them, to keep them quiet, and to make them virtuous. Under the recommendations of this Taft Commission, all the sugar property and all the mining interests will be absorbed by American exploiters.

"Mr. TILLMAN. And what is to hinder the Commission from granting franchises to sell the timber land, too?

"Mr. CAFFERY. Certainly: everything that is valuable will be taken up." (Congressional Record, Fifty-sixth Congress, Second Session, pages 3484, 3257.)

* Congressional Record, Fifty-sixth Congress, Second Session, page 3262.

† *Ibid.*, page 3385.

‡ In a final statement Senator Hoar explained that, while the acceptance of his amendment somewhat "softened the harsh features of this proposition," it remained, to his mind, "a proposition at variance with the principles of the Declaration of Independence, with the principles of the American Constitution, with the principles of every State constitution and every State bill of rights, and with the principles by which and through which and in which the Republican party came to life and has lived from the beginning of its honorable and glorious history." (*Ibid.*, page 3493.)

§ Congressional Record, Fifty-sixth Congress, Second Session, page 3522.

|| *Ibid.*, page 3411.

1898, and at Washington on the seventh day of November, 1900, shall, until otherwise provided by Congress, be vested in such person and persons, and shall be exercised in such manner as the President of the United States shall direct, for the establishment of civil government, and for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion, provided that all franchises granted under the authority thereof shall contain the reservation of the right to alter, amend, or repeal the same.

“Until a permanent government shall have been established in said archipelago, full reports shall be made to Congress, on or before the first day of each regular session, of all legislative acts and proceedings of the temporary government instituted under the provisions hereof; and full reports of the acts and doings of said government, and as to the conditions of the archipelago and its people, shall be made to the President, including all information which may be useful to the Congress in providing for a more permanent government: Provided, That no sale or lease or other disposition of the public lands or the timber thereon or the mining rights shall be made: And provided, further, That no franchise shall be granted which is not approved by the President of the United States, and is not, in his judgment, clearly necessary for the immediate government of the islands and indispensable for the interest of the people thereof, and which cannot, without great public mischief, be postponed until the establishment of permanent civil government; and all such franchises shall terminate one year after the establishment of such permanent civil government.”*

* Various other amendments, framed with a view to limiting the powers of the President, were proposed and voted down. The following, by Senator Rawlins, is the most radical of the rejected amendments: —

“*Provided, further,* That the government of the United States declares that it is its purpose and intention not to retain or exercise permanent control or sovereignty over the Philippine Islands, but only to the extent necessary to

4. Judge Taft's Cable of Congratulation.

March 3, 1901, Judge Taft cabled to the Secretary of War as follows: * —

"MANILA, March 3, 1901.

"On eve of President's second administration, wish to convey to him assurance great progress made toward peace. Since January 1, 1,127 fire-arms captured and 1,368 surrendered. Captures, surrenders, both due co-operation natives.

"Since November, 5,000 bolo-men surrendered in Ilocos, 1,000 in Albay and Camarines. 60,000 residents Panay taken oath allegiance; offensive attack by insurgents now of rarest occurrence; Delgado, insurgent leader Panay, with 350 men and rifles; Angeles and Simon Techon with 200 Bulacan have surrendered. Lacuna, Mascado, Pablo Techon, Sandico, and other leaders have made overtures surrender, but condition immunity from prosecution for alleged complicity in assassination, not conceded, has delayed consummation.

Influence of Federal Party.

"Federal Party, avowed and direct outgrowth election, has spread with wonderful rapidity all parts archipelago, and is active and urgent in advocacy of peace and presenting advantage of civil liberty under American sovereignty; assisted in

secure their pacification and the establishment of a stable government therein by their people; and upon the accomplishment of these ends, and after securing by amicable arrangement suitable naval, military, and coaling stations, and proper guarantees for the safety of those who have adhered to the United States, and for the performance of the treaty obligations of the United States to other nations, the government of the United States intends to withdraw from the said islands, and leave the government and control thereof to their own people, and the powers hereinbefore conferred upon the President and the persons selected by him are to be exercised to the ends herein provided." (Congressional Record, Fifty-sixth Congress, Second Session, page 3503.)

* On file in the Insular Department of the War Department.

securing surrenders in Panay. Party's banquet of 300, eve of Washington's Birthday, and gathering of 7,000 members party on Luneta to hear loyal, earnest addresses leading Filipinos, were most convincing of its power, purpose, completely representative character.

Civil Government Established in Five Provinces.

"Commission has last three weeks organized five provincial governments, Pampanga, Pangasinan, Tarlac, Bulacan, Bataan. Last two are Tagalog provinces. Attended each provincial capital in a body; met by appointment president and councilors and principal men of towns; explained provisions general provincial act and special bill for particular province, and invited discussion natives present of both bills. Conventions thus held very satisfactory; amendments suggested, considered, special bill enacted, appointments followed. Explanation purpose people of United States to secure civil liberty received with enthusiasm. Anxiety for provincial government everywhere apparent, and satisfaction with form adopted manifest. Reception from people at large along way and in capitals most encouraging.

Delegates from Thirty-four out of Thirty-five Towns.

"At Dagupan met convention, three hundred and fifty delegates from thirty-four out of thirty-five towns. In others less delegates in attendance, but not less interested. Enthusiastic meetings Federal Party, called by president and directors' party who accompanied us, held every capital visited. In three large provinces, natives appointed provisional governors. In Bataan, on petition eight out of nine towns, volunteer officer appointed. In Tarlac, feeling between loyal factions required appointment American.

Expressions of Loyalty by Natives Emphatic and Sincere.

"Expression loyalty by all natives in conventions emphatic, sincere. In compliance with urgent native invitations leave

March 11 for south to organize provinces Tayabas, Romblon, Iloilo, Capiz, Zamboanga, such others are ready. Returning, shall organize Zambales, Union, Cagayan, Ilocos, Norte. Military governor has recommended organization Batangas, Cavite, Laguna, Nueva Ecija, but shall delay action as to these until return from northern and southern trips.

"Fragmentary cable despatches detailing small engagements, which are only the result increased activity army after close wet season and efficient policing country, made possible by active native co-operation, create wrong impression on mind of public as to probable continuance war and as to conditions, which have, in fact, never been so favorable to restoration of complete peace and accomplishment of declared purposes of President."

5. Orders for Civil Government in Towns and Provinces.

(a) *The Provincial Government Act.*

The provincial governments referred to in the above cable were constructed in accordance with the Philippine Commission Order 82, enacted February 6, 1901, whose main provisions are as follows :—

A provincial governor, secretary, treasurer, supervisor, and fiscal, none of whom shall have been in arms against the United States or aided such after April 1, 1901 (this date later extended to May 1, 1901) nor violated his oath of allegiance. On the first Monday in February, 1902, and each two years thereafter, a provincial governor shall be elected by the Municipal Councils of the province, assembled in joint convention. (Prior to February, 1902, the Provincial Governors are to be appointed by the Commission.) The Commission reserves the right to appoint to office in case an election (after a second trial) is believed to be unfair or the candidate chosen to be ineligible or suspected of disloyalty. The other officials above named shall be appointed by the

Commission and, except the Fiscal, shall after March 2, 1902, be under the Civil Service rules. Non-residents shall not be disqualified from office, but during their incumbency officials shall reside at the capital of the province. All officials shall take an oath of allegiance to the United States.

The Governor, Treasurer, and Supervisor shall constitute the Provincial Board, among whose duties are the levying of taxes on realty, and the construction and repairs of roads, bridges, and ferries, which are not within the inhabited portions of pueblos and barrios.

The Governor shall control the police of the various municipalities within the province; and he may suspend any municipal officer charged with maladministration, forwarding the complaint to the Commission, which at its discretion may remove or reinstate such official.

Any provincial official may be suspended from office by the Military Governor for disloyalty, dishonesty, oppression, or any misconduct in office; and the Military Governor shall report the case to the Commission which, at its discretion, may either remove or reinstate such official.

Order 107, enacted March 28, 1901, provides that, whenever it is impracticable to appoint civilian officers, the military governor, upon the request of the Commission, may temporarily fill vacancies by detail of military officers.

(b) The Municipal Code.

On January 21, Order 82, for the creation of municipal governments, was adopted by the Commission. Its main provisions are: —

A president, vice-president, and municipal council, chosen at large by qualified voters; municipal suffrage to be limited to legal male residents who have taken the oath of allegiance to the United States, who are over twenty-three years of age; and —

(a) Who have held office under the Spanish government; or

(b) Who own real property to the value of 500 pesos or pay taxes to the amount of 30 pesos annually; or

(c) Who speak, read, and write English or Spanish.

Persons who shall be in arms against the United States, or who shall aid such after April 1, 1901 (this date later extended to May 1, 1901), are excluded from suffrage.

Persons under twenty-six years of age, ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries from provincial, departmental, or government funds, and contractors for public work of the municipality, and those who have taken and violated the oath of allegiance, are debarred from office. All office-holders must take the oath of allegiance to the United States.

The president shall appoint (subject to the approval of the Council) the treasurer, secretary, and other subordinate officers, and in general shall discharge such duties as are usually performed by mayors of cities in the United States.

The revenue of the municipality shall be devoted exclusively to local purposes, and at least one-fourth of the taxes collected on land and improvements shall be devoted to the maintenance of free primary schools or the erection of suitable school buildings.

The Municipal President is authorized to use as a symbol of office a cane with "gold head, gilt ferrule, and silver cord and tassels"; the Vice-President is authorized to use a similar gold-headed cane, with black cord and tassels; and the Councillors, "a cane with a silver head, plated ferrule, and black cord and tassels."

In provinces still under military government the Municipal Council may provide a police force only upon the approval of the Military Governor or of the commanding officer of the military district; and, in case the Military Governor shall deem necessary, the police force shall be directly subject to his orders or those of his authorized subordinates. Also the Military Governor, through his subordinates, may inspect and investigate the official books and records of a municipality,

and may suspend or remove any official found guilty of "inefficiency, misconduct, or disloyalty," and at his discretion may appoint the successor of an official so removed. Whenever a form of civil government has been established in a province, the power of suspension, removal, and appointment of officials within the province shall be vested in the Commission and its authorized agents.

The Oath of Allegiance to the United States.

It will be observed from the above abstracts that Filipinos who have not taken the oath of allegiance to the United States are not only excluded from office, but are disfranchised. This certainly puts a high premium on the taking of the oath.

In this connection the following extracts from captured Filipino letters * are of interest. One writer says : —

"Twice have we taken an oath : the first time to the government of the Filipino Republic, promising voluntarily to protect it and have it protected, to fulfil and have fulfilled all that is exacted, while it had life with authority and without it, which is no secret. The second time we also took oath to the respectable government of North America, obliged to do so through fear.

"The two cases explained keep us in constant perturbation on account of the compromises in which our dignity is put as to which of them we must prefer."

Another letter argues that those who have taken the oath have "the right of preference of which oath to observe." The "oath to the American flag is imposed, even as may be said, by force," while the oath to the Filipino flag was "voluntary and spontaneous." "The right of preference to our Patria is indisputable, both by priority and by the absence of the evil which taints that made before the American. The latter one is of no value."

* Captured Insurgent Documents shown the editors by the courtesy of the War Department.

The only sub-report as to conditions under civil rule, which the editors have seen, is that for the province of Bataan, for March. With one exception the reports of the various municipalities in this province indicate that civil government is working well, and is cordially supported by the natives. The exception is found in the following report * from Orani, province of Bataan : —

“The people have been peaceful and quiet, not a hostile shot having been fired at the town since the entering of the American garrison. But they are, in my opinion, almost all contributing to the insurgent cause, and, like every other town in the province, use every effort to conceal, hide, and protect men well known to themselves as insurgents from the American authorities.

“It is hoped that the influence of the ‘Federal Party’ will correct this. But, in the event of failure to do so, I feel confident that, with the aid of reliable secret service men,— say Ilocanos that can be obtained in Manila,— and placed three or four of them in each town under the direction of one of them of undoubted courage and ability who can also be obtained, the towns would be quickly cleared of this disturbing element.

“It is almost positively known that this town, as well as others of this province, has a secret Filipino government ; and, in my opinion, the province is not ready for provincial government until these secret governments are destroyed. It is my opinion that some severe examples of punishment among the civil officials of the province are necessary.”

The above report, be it noted, is simply the opinion of one man. But it is significant as raising the question as to whether the double system of government, which a short time before had been so general throughout the archipelago, had disappeared with the inauguration of civil rule.

* On file at the War Department.

V. THE LATTER END OF THE STRUGGLE.

It will be remembered that in his cable on March 4, 1901,* Judge Taft said conditions "have, in fact, never been so favorable to restoration of complete peace." At the time this statement was made, the encouraging element in the situation was not that there had been a large number of important surrenders, but that the non-combatants who had previously been supporting the insurrection, had now organized for peace. Months before General MacArthur had stated that, if the support of non-combatants should be withdrawn, the insurrection must inevitably collapse on short order. The events which followed the December 20th Proclamation, and the organization of the Federal Party, amply bore out this prophecy.

In March, however, the number of men in arms had not yet materially decreased. It was still impossible, in most districts, for a detail of twenty men to travel from post to post without danger of attack. The insurrectos were still issuing orders threatening vengeance upon traitors to the insurgent cause.† Probably few in America who read Judge Taft's encouraging cable realized the hard work still ahead of our soldiers—the long weeks of scouting night and day over almost impassable mountain trails, through regions never penetrated by the Spaniards—before the Filipino leaders could be brought in and the country fairly considered pacified.

* See page 85 above.

† In the province of Tayabas, where there were 1,400 members of the Federal Party, a proclamation was issued by the insurgent governor of the province, denouncing this party, and threatening "destruction in all towns in which committees continue to work after seven days from notice to disband." Contained in Diary of Events from March 14 to April 17. Received by the War Department May 24, 1901.

1. The Surrender of General Delgado.

The most notable exception to the above was the island of Panay, in which had occurred the only important surrender since the election.

It will be remembered that in October, 1900,* General Hughes reported a gradual change of sentiment on the part of "that class of people who wear shoes." By December the desire for peace had grown so strong among the influential class that, as has been seen,† a circular letter was written by the leading citizens, urging General Delgado, in command of the insurrectionary forces of Iloilo Province, to surrender. On the 12th of the month Delgado sent word that he would make formal reply to the letter after consulting with his leaders.‡

On the 1st of January a native priest presented himself "to tender surrender of General Delgado and troops immediately with him." January 9, General Hughes reported that Delgado had surrendered and was trying to get his people together. At that time 41,000 persons in Iloilo Province had "accepted conditions and taken the oath of allegiance."§ February 2, General Hughes made the following report: || —

"Formal surrender of main portion of insurgent troops in Iloilo Province took place at Jaro, comprising 30 officers, 140 men with arms, and a large number without arms. This was in accordance with the expressed wish of General Delgado, his subordinate officers, the native peace commission, and officials of the various towns, sanctioned by the department

* See page 26 above.

† See page 59 above.

‡ Diary of Events from December 29 to January 12. Received by the War Department March 4, 1901.

§ *Ibid.*

|| Diary of Events from February 15 to February 27. Received by the War Department April, 1901.

commander, and was for the purpose of impressing the people. . . . Jaro was elaborately decorated, and at least 10,000 people were present to witness the ceremony. The insurgent troops were brought from Santa Barbara nearly to Jaro in wagon trains, when they dismounted and formed. Escorted by a detachment of mounted infantry, Major Noble, accompanied by General Delgado, Colonel Jalandoni, Major Roses, and other insurgent officers, the peace committee, and prominent citizens who had helped to bring about the surrender, headed the column, followed by the insurgent troops. Passing through a large arch, the column marched past two companies of the Twenty-sixth Infantry, the town council, and a delegation of prominent natives drawn up in line to receive them, and swung into line facing the large plaza, in continuation of our line. The colors were then escorted to the front and centre of the whole line, the American and Filipino troops presented arms, and the band played the national air, the entire crowd uncovering and showing the utmost respect and attention. The ceremony was simple, dignified, and impressive. The troops then marched to the barracks, where all arms and accoutrements were deposited. The city of Jaro entertained American and Filipino officers and soldiers, and congratulatory addresses on the progress of peace were made in the town hall."

General Delgado, whose surrender produced such an effect in the pacification of Panay, had been prominent even before the beginning of the insurrection against United States rule. It was he to whom the Spanish General Rios surrendered Ilqilo in December, 1898. When General Miller entered Iloilo Harbor a few days later, he found the city quiet and orderly, no looting or disturbance, and business progressing, — a fact which bore high tribute to Delgado's control of his men.

When General Miller demanded that Iloilo be turned over to the Americans, Delgado supported the local presidente

in declaring that no such step could be taken without authority from Aguinaldo. After hostilities broke out in Luzon and General Miller began to bombard the city, Delgado gave orders to burn it. From that time on he made every effort to harass the army of occupation, in which efforts he had the support of men in arms and non-combatants alike. It will be remembered that in September, 1900, General Hughes reported, "The people of the island are a unit against us."

The *Outlook* of April 20, 1901, contains the following item:—

"Up to the time of his surrender General Delgado was not only the chief insurgent leader in the island of Panay, but his ability, as shown during the occupation of the city of Iloilo by the insurgent forces in the early part of the war, was such that he is undoubtedly to-day the most beloved of Filipino officials among the native population; while he is recognized by the Americans as by far the ablest native in the island."

When the Commission established civil government in Iloilo Province in May, 1901, they appointed Delgado as the first governor.

2. The Surrender of General Trias.

The first important surrender in the island of Luzon after the organization of the Federal Party was that of General Trias, commander of the insurrectionary forces in Southern Luzon, who with his subordinate officers and men came in March 15, 1901.

General Trias had been prominent in the rebellion of 1896 against Spain, had held important positions under the insurgent government, and, with the possible exception of Aguinaldo, was the most influential man in Southern Luzon. It

will be remembered that the secret service memorandum, quoted page 21 above, stated that Trias had so great an influence even with the little children in his native province that no one would betray him, and that, "when he is gone, there will be no more revolution in Cavite."

His surrender, which occurred at San Francisco de Malabon, was a most impressive ceremony. The *Manila American* of March 17 contains an interview with Major Huntington of the law firm of Huntington, Marple, and White in Manila, describing the occasion.

"The Fourth Infantry," says the *American*, "to whose tireless campaign, unceasing night and day for months," this surrender "is wholly due, looked proud and satisfied," while the Filipinos, when he took the oath, "cheered the submission, and shed tears of sad contentment. . . .

"I am no live hero-worshipper; but Trias, by his bearing, impressed me as with the full knowledge that by his action fell the last hope of the insurrection. . . . General Trias has fought long and earnestly for the cause which he had been led to believe was just. When prisoners were brought to him, the general always treated them well, so far as his jurisdiction existed. It was only when his presence was demanded elsewhere that ill-treatment of prisoners took place. The general has a pleasant, intelligent countenance."

General Trias stated that it was a petition from the Woman's Peace League,* which had finally induced him to lay down his arms. Unlike many of the Filipino officers, Trias had waited until all of his command was ready to surrender with him; and, having come in, he was eager to persuade his companions in arms to do likewise.

* According to the *Manila American* this Peace League had been formed January 25, 1901, with twenty-five members. It had a board of directors composed of four American women and four Filipinos, with Mrs. Taft as president. Its chief function was to work for the surrender of the men in arms.

Letter to Companions in Arms.

On the 28th of March, General Trias wrote the following circular letter to his brother officers : * —

"I let you know that on the 15th I surrendered to Lieutenant Colonel Frank D. Baldwin, Fourth Infantry, military commander of San Francisco, this province, together with my staff and others composing the government of my general headquarters of the south of Luzon.

"I do not know, my companions, what effect this unexpected occurrence may have had on you. And to-day, both to relieve my conscience and to satisfy you, I wish to state the reasons for the change in my attitude.

"You are well aware of my innermost ideas and convictions in regard to the fate of our country,—how I have wished to see her free and happy, and how to that end I have been obliged to sacrifice family considerations and make light even of life itself. During five years of the most arduous campaigning, maintaining the defence of our cause by force and by strategy, I canvassed all means, and examined one by one all resources which could in any way lead to the success of our aspirations. And, oh, with what horror I saw it! I observed, as the war went on, that the horizon of our future became narrower and more narrow and that the Filipino problem became darker and more complicated. In these last periods the revolution has assumed an aspect yet more gloomy and discouraging,—property destroyed, fields deserted, woes of women and orphans by the domestic fireside,—all consequences of war and its devastating progress.

"Oppressed by the weight of so many calamities, the people asked for peace, and sought insistently for the tranquillity they had lost through war; and where were they to go to obtain the one or the other? To the army of occupation? To the American government or the defenders of the revolution?

* Diary of Events from March 14 to April 17. Received by the War Department May 24, 1901.

“ The first, as we already know, maintains that peace does not lie with them, but must come as the result of the pacific attitude of the country which deceives itself in seeing in America the enemy of our liberty and well-being.

“ In the face of such reasons, the last mentioned — or, in other words, the revolution — could not be indifferent ; and it was their duty to listen to the voice of their brothers.

“ To continue in the disregard of that voice, to cause the war to continue and assume greater proportions in its destructive consequences, seemed to me to be inhuman and impolitic.

“ If the remedy is not found in one way, it was natural to look for another ; and, having in view that the noise of war would be silenced and that reason, backed up by legality might speak, I surrendered.

“ And to-day, as I find myself in this situation, with my point of view of these matters changed, I am convinced, not only that force can and should not be all, but that much more can be gained by reasonable conduct, since America, as a nation that hates and does not recognize slavery, promises for all liberty of speech, and freedom to ask for anything within reason and justice.

“ Examine the country from a political and social point of view, and observe whether it has not merely ability, but even the aptitude — to direct alone its own destination.

“ Go over in your minds the different conditions that the country has been in on account of the war up until lately, and state solemnly what in reason is the best for it. I, without hesitation, am the first to give it as my opinion that the country, in order to proceed with firm and sure step to the height of its happiness and welfare, needs nothing more than reliance on some strong support that may lend it the necessary life and energy ; and for this purpose none can be better than the United States, which has, I am convinced, no other design respecting the future of the Philippines than the union of its forces with our own for the advancement of

the intellectual and commercial life of the Filipino people. On the one hand you see its municipal and civil governments, on the other its interest in saving us from the ambition of the friars, and its innumerable projects for the construction of canals and railroads — all this that our fields may again be fruitful, and receive new impulse our paralyzed industries. All these advantages and yet more in a not far distant day, being sustained by the priceless boon of liberty, and guarded by the generous American Union, will be, with its mighty commerce, the greatest country of this extreme of the Orient.

“America does not deprive us of property, throws no impediment in the path of the advancement of agriculture or industry, and, in case money be lacking to develop the country, I have been assured that it can be secured at an insignificant rate of interest. Nevertheless, all these advantages (and I feel sure you will not claim them as the fruits of war) proceed from the most sincere desire of this great nation that the Filipino people may be as happy as its own are, and what good can you indicate to me resulting to the country from this war? You will answer that good will come out of it later — but are you sure of that, and when will it come?

“In the mean time I see but a picture of miseries, tears, desolation, and ruin and God knows if at the end the country will ever return to its former state.

“I know that you are a patriot, a man of healthy mind, and one who appreciates realities; and, as a friend and a companion, I desire that you give way to reason, and labor with me for the restoration of our beloved land, since the great American Nation does not haggle with us in our attainment of that end.

“Let us dry these many tears and return to the domestic firesides the consolation that the actual state of affairs has robbed them.

"Think and meditate over this matter and do not be deaf to the clamors of the people who now ask for peace, and in the mean while command the services of your companion.

"MARIANO TRIAS."

Effect of the Trias Letter.

One of the immediate results of the above letter was the pacification of the island of Marinduque.* On the 6th of April, 1901, Colonel Abad, leader of the insurrectionary forces in Marinduque, wrote to Major Smith, in command of the United States forces in the island "requesting a suspension of hostilities for seven days, in order that he might concentrate his officers for a conference and consider the communications received from General Trias through the Commissioners." An armistice was granted until midnight the 14th instant. On the 15th, Colonel Abad and his forces surrendered. "This," says Major Smith, "practically ends the insurrection on this island."

According to Associated Press despatches, General Trias has recently been appointed Governor of Cavite,—an auspicious event, he being much loved, so it is said, by the people of his native province.

3. The Capture of Aguinaldo.

In the last days of March occurred the most dramatic incident connected with Philippine-American history,—the capture of Aguinaldo. After numerous rumors, reported with more or less assurance ever since his narrow escape in May, 1900, that the former President of the so-called Philippine Republic was dead, the country was suddenly startled by the news that General Funston, with a handful of men,

* Report from island of Marinduque contained in Diary of Events from March 14 to April 17. Received by the War Department May 24, 1901.

had gone up into the mountains and captured him. The story of the expedition is best told in General Funston's own words : * —

" MANILA, March 28, 1901.

" TO THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES :

" *Sir*,—I have the honor to make the following brief preliminary report of the capture of Emilio Aguinaldo. On February 8 last there presented themselves at Pantabangan, a town in my district, the fourth of Department of Northern Luzon, a native bearing despatches from Aguinaldo to Baldemero Aguinaldo, Lacuna, Sandico, Tecson, and other insurgent officers. These despatches did not state exactly where he was, but were dated January 12, 13, and 14, 1901. The bearer stated he had left Aguinaldo at his permanent quarters in the small town of Palanan, province of Isabella, on the last date, and had come via Casiguran and Baler. Also, after being promised substantial reward, was willing to help capture him. One of the letters given up by this man was one ordering additional troops to be sent him from Nueva Ecija.

" Arranged to organize an expedition which could pass off as these expected re-enforcements. Four ex-insurgent officers known to be thoroughly committed to our cause were selected to pass off as officers, while seventy-eight Macabe scouts, all of whom spoke Tagalo, took the part of insurgent soldiers. These latter were armed with Mausers and Remingtons, and dressed as insurgents.

" Expedition sailed from Manila March 6, on U. S. S. 'Vicksburg,' Commander E. B. Barry commanding. On voyage Macabes were very carefully instructed in their part. Expedition landed on east coast of Luzon, between Baler and Casiguran, 2 A.M., March 14.

" The five American officers — Captain Hazard, 11th Cav-

* Diary of Events from March 14 to April 17. Received by the War Department May 24, 1901.

alry, Captain Harry Newton, 34th Infantry, Lieutenant Hazard, 11th Cavalry, Lieutenant B. J. Mitchell, 40th Infantry, A.D.C., and myself — were dressed as private soldiers and carried as supposed prisoners. Expedition marched north to Casiguran, having landed about twenty miles south of that point, which was reached that night. This is an ungarrisoned town. Insurgent Vice-Presidente was completely fooled, and never suspected nature of expedition. He got us food and pack-bearers for the journey, and furnished men to act as couriers in advance. These couriers carried two letters to Aguinaldo over the successfully forged signature of General Lacuna, stating that, in accordance with his orders of January 14, he was sending him one of his best companies under a trusted officer. This officer, one of the Tagalos, also sent a letter reporting his arrival at Casiguran, after a march of fifteen days from Lacuna's headquarters. He stated that *en route* he had surprised a small American detachment, taking five prisoners which he was bringing with him. The march from Casiguran was resumed on March 17. We had but little food, mostly cracked corn and small quantity dried meat. Many hardships endured, rains continuous and trails fearful. No people seen but a few savages. On evening of March 22d reached point eight miles from Palanan so exhausted from fatigue and hunger some men could not march. Courier sent to Palanan with letter to Aguinaldo, asking for food. Came back with supply. March resumed next morning, reaching Palanan 3 P.M., March 23d. Aguinaldo's escort of 40 men drawn up to receive us. At proper moment disguise thrown off. Macabes opened fire on insurgents, who fled precipitately; two were killed; 18 rifles, 1,000 rounds ammunition abandoned. Aguinaldo seized, also his chief of staff, Colonel Simeon Villa, who was wounded, and his treasurer, Santiago Barcelona. They were all completely overwhelmed with surprise at discovery of our real nature.

“On the 25th we marched to Palanan Bay, six miles, and

met 'Vicksburg,' which was to be there on that date, and sailed for Manila. Very careful estimate of distance marched each day aggregated 116 miles.

"Very respectfully,

"FREDERICK FUNSTON.

"P.S.—In closing, I wish to bear testimony to the splendid co-operation received from Commander Barry and other officers of the 'Vicksburg,' without whose assistance, always cheerfully given, the success of the expedition would have been impossible.—F. F."*

Aguinaldo's Peace Manifesto.

The Federal Party leaders, with General MacArthur's permission, visited Aguinaldo immediately after his arrival in Manila. It was Chief Justice Arellano, formerly attorney-general in Aguinaldo's cabinet, who finally persuaded him,† on April 1, to take the oath of allegiance to the United States.

The oath once taken, the American authorities desired Aguinaldo to issue a manifesto which might help to induce the surrender of the men still in arms.

April 19 the following manifesto ‡ was issued:—

"I believe I am not in error in presuming that the unhappy fate to which my adverse fortune has led me is not a surprise to those who have been familiar with the progress of the war. The lessons taught with a full meaning and which have recently come to my knowledge suggest with irresistible force that a complete termination of hostilities and lasting peace are

* On the 6th of May, 1901, General Funston made a detailed report of the capture of Aguinaldo, which was given to the papers by the War Department July 13. The above report gives in brief all the essential facts contained in the longer report.

† It is said that at first Aguinaldo obstinately replied to all entreaties that he had sworn to support the insurrection until his last breath, and that no new oath could have any meaning.

‡ On file in the Insular Department of the War Department.

not only desirable, but absolutely essential to the welfare of the Philippine Islands.

"The Filipinos have never been dismayed at their weakness, nor have they faltered in following the path pointed out by their fortitude and courage. The time has come, however, in which they find their advance along this path to be impeded by an irresistible force, which, while it restrains them, yet enlightens their minds and opens to them another course, presenting them the cause of peace. This cause has been joyfully embraced by the majority of my fellow-countrymen, who have already united around the glorious sovereign banner of the United States. In this banner they repose their trust, and believe that under its protection the Filipino people will attain all those promised liberties which they are beginning to enjoy.

"The country has declared unmistakably in favor of peace. So be it. There has been enough blood, enough tears, and enough desolation. This wish cannot be ignored by the men still in arms if they are animated by a desire to serve our noble people, which has thus clearly manifested its will. So do I respect this will, now that it is known to me.

"After mature deliberation, I resolutely proclaim to the world that I cannot refuse to heed the voice of a people longing for peace, nor the lamentations of thousands of families yearning to see their dear ones enjoying the liberty and the promised generosity of the great American Nation.

"By acknowledging and accepting the sovereignty of the United States throughout the Philippine Archipelago, as I now do, and without any reservation whatsoever, I believe that I am serving thee, my beloved country. May happiness be thine!

"EMILIO AGUINALDO."

The manifesto, as published throughout the Philippines, was prefaced by the following comment from General MacArthur : * —

* On file in the Insular Department of the War Department.

"In order to signalize such an important step in the pacification of the country, 1,000 prisoners of war will, upon taking the oath of allegiance, be released and sent to their homes, for which purpose the Provost Marshal General will give the necessary orders."

Effect of Aguinaldo's Capture.

Many and diverse were the opinions expressed in this country as to the probable effect of Aguinaldo's capture. General Otis had said in June, 1900, Aguinaldo "is merely a figure-head. His power was gone when we broke up his government, and captured his advisers and friends. . . . What difference does it make whether Aguinaldo is dead or not, when we know that, if he is not dead, he is a refugee in the mountains, where he can do no one any harm." According to this opinion, many times echoed in the United States, Aguinaldo's capture was a matter of small moment.

General MacArthur, however, in reviewing the matter, says: "In consideration of important immediate results and in the light of remote consequences likely to arise therefrom, the capture of General Aguinaldo may be regarded as the most momentous single event of the year. . . .

"In the first instance, it absolutely dispelled the growing tendency to idealize his personality, and to surround him with mythical legends of invincibility, which millions of natives believed to be true, and which they also believed would ultimately insure the success of the rebellion. With a people so sensitive, impulsive, generous, and imaginative as the Filipinos, the mechanics of sentiment, when well appreciated and well applied, afford many powerful instruments of military and political control. Aguinaldo was the incarnation of the insurrection, and, as such, his death as an incident of combat would simply have translated and magnified the legend, and thereby have placed an ever-ready weapon in the hands of agitators, capable of being utilized at any time, as might be deemed expedient, for purposes of conspiracy and revolt. . . .

"The consequences which have arisen from the capture of Aguinaldo have justified every expectation in the premises. All subsequent surrenders have been more or less influenced and expedited thereby, and many of the most important events of this character must be attributed entirely thereto."

4. The Surrender of Generals Juan and Blas Villamor.

In January, 1901, Ignacio Villamor, brother of Juan and Blas, had been arrested in Manila, but was soon released by General MacArthur as a concession to the Federal Party.* After his release Ignacio wrote a long letter to his brother Blas, then in the insurgent army, urging him to surrender. General Bell allowed Ignacio's sister to be the bearer of the letter, Ignacio believing that his sister would explain that it expressed his true sentiments, and was not written as the price of his liberty. Before leaving, the sister asked General Bell if he would confer with her brother, should her brother so desire, and General Bell had stated that he would.

On the 19th of March, 1901, the sister telegraphed General Bell that her brother accepted "with pleasure" conference with General Bell, but asked "that it be conducted formally or by telegraph from the headquarters of the district. He says that he has not dissolved his agreement with Aguinaldo, and, as a consequence, cannot accept other agreement or decide upon propositions for peace, which can only be done by Aguinaldo; but he offers to forward through proper channels any kind of correspondence to the said Aguinaldo."†

General Wheaton, to whom General Bell applied for instructions, replied through his chief of staff that he had "no peace or other propositions to make to Aguinaldo, nor has he

* Diary of Events from March 14 to April 17. Received by the War Department May 24, 1901.

† *Ibid.*

any promises to make to Villamor, other than the Division Commander's very liberal and generous terms, of which you have been duly informed. The necessity of bringing Villamor to terms speedily by other action than concession or promises is urged." *

From that time on General Bell kept up active scouting throughout the district held by the Villamors, scattering their forces into small bands, Ignacio meanwhile continuing his efforts to effect their surrender. Finally, after conference with Ignacio on the 27th and 28th of April, Blas and Juan Villamor surrendered April 28 with as many of their men as they were able to collect.

On the 1st of May "Blas and Juan Villamor and thirty-six of their officers signed and took formal oath of allegiance under the United States flag, after service in the church, attended by all the insurgents and officers and soldiers of the garrison." †

5. The Surrender of General Tiño.

Manuel Tiño, an Ilocano by birth, had been one of the most active supporters of the rebellion of 1896 against Spain. Although at that time a youth of less than twenty years, he was brave and resourceful, and proved himself a good leader of men. The American prisoners who saw him among his own people during the first year of the insurrection against the United States seem to have received different impressions of his humanity and personal character, but all agree as to his power as a leader.

It was Tiño who held one of the two mountain passes which covered Aguinaldo's flight in December, 1899. After

* Diary of Events from March 14 to April 17. Received by the War Department May 24, 1901.

† Diary of Events from April 17 to May 15. Received by the War Department June 15, 1901.

Aguinaldo's retirement into the mountains, Tiño seems to have become "Commander in Chief of the Insurgent Army." He occupied the Third District of the Department of Northern Luzon, commanded by General Young; and his activity during the fall and winter of 1900 may be inferred from General Young's reports, given above. During February, 1901, General Young reported several times that it was rumored that Tiño was making his way to Manila to surrender; but the rumor seems to have been unfounded.

In April, Tiño's forces were located in the mountains of Abra. At that time, General Bell (who had relieved General Young) reports* that they were suffering from lack of supplies, had for three weeks been scantily fed by the Igorotes, and had been obliged to kill horses for food. On the 27th of April, General Bell further reports:† "A day or so ago I arranged a combined movement of troops from Abra, the northern half of Ilocos Sur and Ilocos Norte, about ten companies and troops in all, to cover every mountain trail from all directions leading into the ranges of mountains running northward from Abra River and paralleling the sea, in which all our information indicated that Tiño was hiding. Have not heard from these troops yet, but think it probable they will scatter Tiño's command very considerably if they do not capture or kill some of them."

The day before the above report was written Tiño had sent in an officer asking for terms. "It is possible," says General Bell,† "that the presence of soldiers everywhere in these mountains had something to do with Tiño's sending an officer here for terms. I was informed by the officer that it was very difficult for them to get food now and very dangerous, as all towns are occupied and no food has been left in the barrios; that Irogotes had also become dangerous to them."

* Diary of Events from April 17 to May 15. Received by the War Department June 15, 1901.

† *Ibid.*

Tiño's messenger was told the terms offered by the Division Commander in December, 1900; and, while in the town, learned that the Villamors had surrendered. He also seemed to have procured a copy of Aguinaldo's manifesto.

On the 29th of April, Captain McDonald encountered Tiño's forces, and defeated them. The following day, General Tiño formally surrendered, with his command, at Sinait.

On the first day of May, General Tiño sent the following despatch* to district headquarters, with a request that it be transmitted:—

“SINAIT, May 1.

“General Aguinaldo (through General Bell), Manila: After having read your proclamation, and observed the situation and the desires of the Ilocano people, I have thought it convenient to give up my arms. By so doing, I believe that I do my duty as a soldier and a citizen.

(Signed)

“M. TIÑO.”

On the 5th of May, 1901, General MacArthur ordered the release of 1,000 prisoners of war, to signalize Tiño's surrender.† In commenting upon the surrender later, General MacArthur says that it must be attributed entirely to Aguinaldo's capture, and that it was “made in such good faith and was so complete in every particular as to insure absolute pacification throughout the entire First District of the Department of Northern Luzon, which at the time presented the most troublesome and perplexing military problem in all Luzon.”

* Diary of Events from April 17 to May 15. Received by War Department June 15, 1901.

† General Order 89.

6. The Surrender of Generals Alejandrino and Lacuna.

Joaquin Alejandrino, a representative of the wealthier classes in Southern Luzon, had likewise been prominent in the 1896 rebellion, and, according to Foreman, had continued in arms after Aguinaldo's departure from the Philippines, in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Biac-na-Bato.

In the subsequent struggle against American occupation he took a prominent part. After Aguinaldo's retirement into the mountains, Alejandrino was made commander of the insurrectionary forces of Northern Luzon. With General Lacuna, another insurgent officer of prominence, he operated in the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts of Northern Luzon.

Just how large a force Alejandrino and Lacuna commanded it is impossible to tell. On the 3d of June,* 1900, Lacuna with 200 men was attacked by our forces and defeated with heavy loss. July 4, 1900,† Lacuna with 700 men attacked simultaneously three towns occupied by American troops, and was driven back with a loss of several hundred men. These disasters, however, did not seem to cripple their forces seriously, as they obstinately continued hostilities.

In December, 1900, it was reported that Alejandrino and Lacuna were in the vicinity of Mount Ararat, and accordingly troops were sent out to cover the mountain and capture them, if possible. A prisoner captured December 29 reported ‡ that "Alejandrino and 30 men have no place to sleep, as over a dozen cuartels have been burned." That same day, General Grant reported,§ "At present sending more men,

* Chronological list of engagements on file at the War Department.

† *Ibid.*

‡ Diary of Events from April 17 to May 15. Received by the War Department June 15, 1901.

§ *Ibid.*

mounted and dismounted, to scout country around the base of all mountains, so as to prevent any one escaping." For three weeks the troops scouted without avail. On January 23, General Funston reported that he thought the insurgent leaders must have escaped to Candaba swamp, "where they are safer than elsewhere."

On the 29th of April, Alejandrino came in to Ararat, and, after conferring with General Funston, sent the following despatch to General MacArthur: * —

"With the authorization of General Funston I have the honor to inform you that I have come to the American lines, my principal object being to negotiate the surrender of my forces and those of General Lacuna, if you will accept certain conditions which General Funston told me would be easily obtained. I wish to finish my mission as soon as possible, in order to communicate your answer to General Lacuna and avoid the useless shedding of any more blood."

On the same day, General MacArthur telegraphed General Wheaton † to "Send Alejandrino to Manila to the Provost Marshal General, for confinement at the Anda Street Station. No action will be taken as to his trial till all papers in the case have been submitted to and acted upon by these headquarters."

As Alejandrino did not return to confer with Lacuna, the latter did not come in to surrender. Finally, May 9, General Funston went to Papaya to hold a conference with Lacuna, and took Alejandrino with him. On May 19, General Funston reported: ‡ —

"Lacuna and his entire force surrendered here to-day. 31 officers, 200 men, 240 rifles, 6 revolvers, 4,000 rounds of

* Diary of Events from April 17 to May 15. Received by the War Department June 15, 1901.

† *Ibid.*

‡ Diary of Events from May 16 to June 2. Received by the War Department July 12.

ammunition. Oath was administered to all, including Alejandro, and they have been placed at liberty."

The same day, General Wheaton reported to the Adjutant-general of the Division : * —

"Lacuna having surrendered with all his officers and men to-day, I report that all insurrectionary leaders in this Department have been captured or have surrendered. There is a termination of the state of war in this Department, so far as armed resistance to the authorities of the United States is concerned."

On the following day, General McArthur ordered the release of 500 prisoners of war to signalize the above surrender and acceptance of the sovereignty of the United States.†

7. The Surrender of General Cailles.

In Southern Luzon the progress of pacification was obstinately slow after the one great advance gained in General Trias's surrender. General Trias's successor, as commander-in-chief of the insurrectionary forces in Southern Luzon, was Juan Cailles, who seems to have come into prominence early in the year 1900.‡

On the 5th of August, 1900, his stronghold at Pagsanjan, Laguna Province, was destroyed.§ Papers captured at that time show that he was considered by Filipino representatives

* Diary of Events from May 16 to June 2. Received by the War Department July 12.

† General Order 97.

‡ It will be remembered that Cailles was the author of the orders quoted by General MacArthur, directing the assassination of two Americanistas. See "A Period of Guerrilla Warfare," page 63. On the other hand, it was Cailles who recently returned the bodies of ten of our soldiers, one with two hundred dollars in gold in his pocket.

§ Chronological list of engagements on file at the War Department.

in Hongkong and elsewhere as one of the controlling forces of the insurrection.*

Even after the election, Cailles kept up the struggle with great persistence.

General Trias, in conjunction with the Federal Party, made an effort, after his own surrender, to bring Cailles in. Apparently in "reference to the efforts of the Federal Party through its delegates," says Captain Chase,† the following bando, dated Juan Cailles's Camp, April 15, was published by posters throughout the town of Pagsanjan: —

"Countrymen: The news has been spread about that General Cailles is desirous of surrendering to the enemy. I therefore beg to inform all that until peace, or our desire, is given to the Philippine Islands, fighting will never cease while life lasts. This we have sworn to, and your General and Political Military Chief will comply with."

April 26, "Cailles's general camp and maestranza, together with his personal effects, correspondence, etc., and nearly all of his general staff, surprised and captured at Dugat Dugat, Luzon, by Captain Chase."‡

On the following day, General Wade, who had replaced General Bates as Commander of Department of Southern Luzon, reported from General Sumner: § —

"Five officers captured by Captain Chase have brought letters to Señor Razalcida and myself from General Cailles, saying he is willing to surrender, but before he does he desires to have a conference with us and Señor Vicente Reyes, Presidente of Federal Party here, and also with his

* Captured Insurgent Documents on file at the War Department.

† Diary of Events from April 17 to May 15. Received by the War Department June 15, 1901.

‡ Compilation of Captures and Surrenders from April 18 to May 15, made by the War Department.

§ Diary of Events from April 17 to May 15. Received by the War Department June 15, 1901.

Chief Commander in Laguna, Tayabas, and Infanta Provinces, because, if he surrenders, it will be with all his command. He also says that from the 24th instant he has suspended operations for the purpose of having this conference. We believe that, if you will suspend operations for five days, we can obtain the surrender of General Cailles."

"Upon receipt of the above," says General Wade,* "I sent the following telephone message to General Sumner: 'Tell Colonel Auman to send word to General Cailles that operations will not be suspended for one moment, that the time for conferences has gone by, that no propositions from General Cailles will be entertained except unconditional surrender.'"

After this date, Cailles redoubled his energies. During May, General Trias again sent an emissary to confer with Cailles. Cailles repeated his request for a suspension of hostilities and the establishment of a neutral zone, in order that he might the more easily confer with the peace agents.

General Sumner once more refused to suspend hostilities, stating, however, that the town of Pagsanjan should be regarded as neutral territory. In reporting this fact, General Sumner stated,† "My opinion is that Cailles is in the vicinity, and can easily reach that town if he wishes to."

As Cailles did not come in, the American troops pressed him harder than before. May 20, General Wade reports‡ that the town of Nagalang was fired upon by the insurgents. He adds, "Attack was probably intended as a diversion to get troops away from vicinity of Cailles."

About this time, Cailles seems to have escaped south into the province of Sorsogon. May 28, General Wade reports the following: § —

* Diary of Events from April 17 to May 15. Received by the War Department June 15, 1901.

† Diary of Events from May 16 to June 2. Received by War Department July 12, 1901.

‡ *Ibid.* § *Ibid.*

"At 2.45 P.M., 26th instant, about three hundred armed insurgents attacked the town of Donsol, province of Sorsogon, in three columns. The fight lasted about two hours. Many insurgents were wounded. One in guard-house states that five of his column were wounded within fifteen minutes after the attack began. They approached within one hundred yards of the town, and fell back gradually, occupying a line one mile and a half long. It is reported that about five hundred riflemen and three thousand bolo-men are within ten miles of Donsol. Necessary steps have been taken. . . . Captain Davis struck the trail of Cailles about five miles from Tayabas; but Cailles escaped to the mountains on the Tayabas-Mauban trail, towards Antimonan. He is said to have forty cavalry and fifty infantry, fully equipped. Cailles is very sick, and is being carried in a hammock. This information, obtained from captured soldiers of the enemy, was confirmed by the inhabitants of house where he stopped and by the natives along his trail. Cailles's force is scattered completely in the mountains, and all trace of him is lost."

June 24, 1901, Cailles with 600 officers and men and 386 rifles surrendered at Santa Cruz, and took the oath of allegiance to the United States.*

8. General Malvar still in the Field.

The following report was made April 28, 1901, to the Adjutant-general of Southern Luzon: † —

"I have spent a month trying to disintegrate Malvar's force. I have succeeded thus far in inducing two of his strongest men, Colonels Ciprano Callao and Gregorio Kateibac,

* Cipher cable on file at War Department.

† Diary of Events from April 17 to May 15. Received by War Department June 15, 1901.

with their battalions to come in. They this day have surrendered with 23 other officers and 108 men, 186 serviceable rifles. Two thousand dollars gold more required to make payments on prospective surrenders of arms. I have been greatly assisted by the Federal Party. I have information that I consider reliable that Malvar will present himself in a few days.

(Signed)

"KLINE, *commanding.*"

Malvar did not present himself in a few days, however, but, after Cailles's surrender, became Commander-in-general of the insurrectionary forces in Southern Luzon. Owing to his activities, Southern Luzon, on July 4, 1901, the date of General MacArthur's latest report, was the only portion of the archipelago still in a disturbed condition.

It is impossible to say how much of a force Malvar represents. Whether the scattered troops which other surrendering generals were unable to collect and bring in have rallied to General Malvar's assistance, thus providing him with a fairly large command, is unknown.

A Summary of Surrenders.

It was stated above that in March the encouraging feature of the situation was the attitude taken by the non-combatants rather than any great decrease in the number of men in arms. This statement is further supported by the following figures: —

Insurgent Surrenders.

During March, April, and May, 1901, 1,262 officers, 12,682 men.

During the last week of April, 1901, 271 officers, 3,554 men.

During December, 1900, January and February, 1901, 166 officers, 3,136 men.

The most significant feature of the above tables is the large number of surrenders during the last week of April, — almost

a third of the total number for March, April, and May, and greater than the number during the three months prior to March. It is an undoubted fact that the straits to which the insurgents were reduced by the withdrawal of the support from occupied towns, and the persistent activity of our soldiers, followed upon the December 20 order, and the formation of the Federal Party, became daily more unendurable. Early in the new year, if not before, it must have become evident to the insurgents that they were fighting for a lost cause.* All this, however, was, in the nature of the case, a gradual process; and it seems obvious that during the last days of April some additional force was at work. It is possible that Aguinaldo's manifesto of April 19 was sufficient in itself to account for the large number of surrenders at that time; but the probabilities are that the order disfranchising all who were in arms on or after May 1 was an added factor in the case.

Whatever may have been the forces at work late in April, the prisoner Mabini still held out. In the April report for the island of Guam, Major Orwig states that the prisoners "express themselves generally as being anxious to return to the Philippines and willing to submit to American rule. Mabini has, however, made no such declaration; and, while he is entirely submissive to the prison rules, there still seems to be an undercurrent of resistance and a determination to be a martyr."

* During January, February, March, and April, 1901, there were only 12 attacks by the insurgents, according to the chronological list of engagements on file at the War Department.

VI. THE STATUS QUO.

Inauguration of Civil Rule.

On the 21st of June, 1901, the President sent the following cable* to the Philippines:—

“On and after the fourth day of July, nineteen hundred and one, until it shall be otherwise ordered, the President of the Philippine Commission will exercise the executive authority in all civil affairs in the government of the Philippine Islands heretofore exercised in such affairs by the Military Governor of the Philippines; and to that end the Hon. William H. Taft, President of the said Commission, is hereby appointed Civil Governor of the Philippine Islands. Such executive authority will be exercised under and in conformity to, the instructions to the Philippine Commission, dated April seventh, nineteen hundred, and subject to the approval and control of the Secretary of War of the United States. The municipal and provincial civil governments, which have been, or shall hereafter be, established in said islands, and all persons performing duties appertaining to the offices of civil government in said islands, will, in respect of such duties, report to the Civil Governor.

“The power to appoint civil officers, heretofore vested in the Philippine Commission or in the Military Governor, will be exercised by the Civil Governor, with the advice and consent of the Commission.

“The Military Governor of the Philippines is hereby relieved from the performance, on and after the said fourth day of July, of the civil duties hereinbefore described; but his authority will continue to be exercised, as heretofore, in those

* On file at the War Department.

districts in which insurrection against the authority of the United States continues to exist, or in which public order is not sufficiently restored to enable provincial civil governments to be established under the instructions to the Commission dated April seventh, nineteen hundred."

In describing the inauguration of Governor Taft as Civil Governor of the Philippines, the Associated Press states that the oath of office was administered by Chief Justice Arellano, and that one "feature of the inaugural address was the announcement that on September 1, 1901, the Commission would be increased by the appointment of three native members, Dr. Pardo DeTavera, Benito Lagarda, and José Luzuriaga."

Changes involved by Civil Rule.

The question has arisen as to the practical effect of the inauguration of civil rule upon the government of the islands. As will be seen from the above cable, the chief difference is that in the central government the civil duties heretofore performed by the Military Governor will now be administered by the Civil Governor. Moreover, in the 22 out of the 77 provinces of the archipelago which had, prior to July 4, been organized under the Provincial Government Code, the civil officers who had previously reported to the Military Governor now report to the Civil Governor. The other 55 provinces remain under military rule. In other words, except for the few Filipinos who hold office, the natives themselves were not directly effected by the event of July 4.

As nearly as can be estimated,* the population of the provinces now organized under the Provincial Code is 3,327,900, while the population of the provinces still under military rule is 3,232,098. Of the 24 provinces and 3,075,245

*The following figures are compiled from the statistics given by the Taft Commission, as to the entire Christian population, and from the estimates made by the Schurman Commission, as to the population of the various provinces.

inhabitants of Luzon proper, 7 provinces with an aggregate population of 1,278,156 are now under provincial government, while 17 provinces with an aggregate population of 1,797,089 are still under military government.

Military Situation July Fourth.

In summarizing the military situation, at the time he left the islands (July 4), General MacArthur says : * —

“As a result of co-operation between the army and the people who accepted the invitation to combine for mutual protection and the welfare of the country, contained in the concluding lines of the proclamation, the armed insurrection is almost entirely suppressed. At the present writing there is no embodied rebel force in all Luzon above the Pasig. In the Department of Visayas all is pacified excepting only the island of Samar; and in the Department of Mindanao and Jolo the Filipino rebels have all submitted and been disarmed. In the Department of Southern Luzon disorders still continue in several provinces, but in such progressively diminishing force as to encourage the hope that all will be pacified at an early date.

“Exceptional conditions exist in Mindanao and Jolo, which are fully described by the Department Commander and the Military Secretary. Serious questions will necessarily arise in that command from time to time, the successful adjustment of which will depend largely upon tact and knowledge of Moro character. General Kobbé and his officers, have managed the situation most admirably, but there must always be much solicitude in regard to functions which depend largely upon the temperament of individuals.

“It is respectfully submitted that the very gratifying conditions herein briefly recapitulated have not been brought about entirely by the hand of Providence. Neither must the attitude of the people who have declared for peace, or even that of the leaders of the Federal Party, be attributed

* General MacArthur's Report of July 4, 1901, page 19.

entirely to unreserved pro-Americanism. It would therefore be unsafe to assume these conservative forces as constant factors, the friendly operation of which can be relied upon, irrespective of external influence.

"In due time, and beyond any question, if beneficent republican institutions are permitted to operate with full force, the Filipino people will become warmly attached to the United States by a sense of self-interest and gratitude. In the mean time the moulding force in the islands must be a well-organized army and navy."

The entire strength of the command in the Philippine Islands, including native scouts and police on July 4, 1901, was 1,105 officers and 54,174 men. Of these, 939 officers and 41,230 men are United States troops; 9 officers and 5,550 men are native scouts; 32 officers and 1,250 men are native police; and 696 men are metropolitan police.*

General MacArthur gives the following table of casualties for the period between May 5, 1900, and June 30, 1901, "during which time 1,026 contacts transpired between the American troops and the insurgents": † —

"AMERICAN CASUALTIES.

"Killed	245
"Wounded	490
"Captured	118
"Missing	20

"INSURGENT CASUALTIES.

"Killed	3,854
"Wounded	1,193
"Captured	6,572
"Surrendered	23,095 "

The American army has (July 4, 1901) secured some 23,000 Filipino guns. General MacArthur states that there are no means of ascertaining how many serviceable guns the

* General MacArthur's Report for July 4, 1901, page 7.

† *Ibid.*, page 21.

insurrectos possess, but he believes that the number now in our possession indicates that "the situation is well under control, so much so as to justify the hope that any reaction which may take place in the future will necessarily assume the form of legitimate political agitation and excitement rather than the form of civil war." *

Native Sentiment.

As to the feeling of the people toward the United States government, Brigadier-general John C. Bates, who was in the Philippines from July 2, 1899, to April, 1901, and who is familiar with conditions throughout the archipelago, in a letter under date of July 18, 1901, says: † —

"The Mohammedan Filipinos do not desire independence but wish the protection of the United States. In my opinion, amongst the Christian Filipinos the desire for complete independence was general with few exceptions. At the present time I believe that a very considerable and influential part, while hoping for eventually a complete independence, believe that they are acting for the best interest of their country in accepting the sovereignty of the United States and in co-operating in the maintenance of order."

The Christian Filipinos, it should be remembered, number 6,559,998.‡

* General MacArthur's Report for July 4, 1901, page 29.

† Letter to one of the editors, published with General Bates's permission.

‡ Report of Taft Philippine Commission, page 23.

The Philippine Review.

Contents.

The second series of publications of the Philippine Information Society, to be issued monthly under the title *The Philippine Review*, will deal among other things with the following interesting and important points:—

Progress in organizing civil government; temper and intelligence of the natives; work of the Army; educational work organized by our government; and the friar question. In treating these questions the Society will give so far as possible both the American and Filipino points of view, as shown in Government Reports, Congressional Debates, Associated Press Despatches, letters from competent persons in the islands, and captured insurgent papers. These last, which were shown the editors by the courtesy of the War Department, afford unusual opportunities for judging the situation, and are of great interest.

The first number of the *Review*, to be issued November 1, will contain a summary of General MacArthur's Report of July 4, 1901 (to be appended to the Report of the Secretary of War for 1901), an advance copy of which the editors have been fortunate enough to secure.

Subscription price to the *Review*, \$1.00.

Membership in the Society, \$5.00. This includes a yearly subscription to the *Review*.

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